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The World Economic Forum’s Global Institute for Partnership
and Governance is pleased to issue this new report of our
Global Corporate Citizenship Initiative (GCCI), which
concentrates on the key drivers of CEO and board leadership
in corporate citizenship at the international level. 
In its report two years ago, GCCI member companies
identified an often sceptical investment community as having
an important influence on how CEOs and boards view
corporate citizenship. To understand better why the
mainstream investment community places relatively modest
emphasis on social, environmental, and ethical issues in
investment valuation and asset allocation decisions, the GCCI
launched a public-private workshop series on “Mainstreaming
Responsible Investment” in partnership with AccountAbility.
There have been many discussions on this question, involving
corporate responsibility experts and representatives of funds
devoted to socially responsible investment. We believe this is
the first set of deep discussions on the topic involving primarily
the mainstream actors themselves, including pension fund
trustees and executives, portfolio managers of asset
management firms, and buy-side and sell-side analysts.
The Mainstreaming Responsible Investment project has
evolved over the past two years through a series of three
roundtables and numerous discussions involving many leading
practitioners across the investment community, public sector,
civil society and labour community. We are appreciative of the
many insights offered by these experts and are particularly
grateful to the hosts of the roundtables: Deutsche Bank, Swiss
Re and the UK Department of Trade and Industry.
We would like to thank our partner in this project,
AccountAbility, and in particular, Mira Merme and Simon Zadek
for applying their time, dedication and deep understanding of
the subject matter to this endeavour. Very special thanks are
due to the three investment community experts who
contributed specific chapters on issues and recommendations
relating to their particular parts of the investment value chain:
Mehdi Mahmud, Executive Vice-President of Jennison
Associates; Francis Condon, Head of European Steel
Research, ABN AMRO Equities1; and Stephen Davis, President
of Davis Global Advisers. They have provided exceptional
thought leadership that amounts to an exemplary act of private
sector leadership on a complex governance challenge.
Our appreciation also goes to Caroline Bergrem, the GCCI’s
former Project Manager as well as Stefanie Held and Valerie
Weinzierl, the current Senior Project Manager and Project
Manager, respectively. Finally, we extend our gratitude to the
CEOs of Global Corporate Citizenship Initiative member
companies and their teams. Their leadership is critically
important to advancing the spirit and practice of global
corporate citizenship.
Richard Samans, Managing Director
Global Institute for Partnership and Governance
World Economic Forum
Geneva, January 2005
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Foreword by the Rt Hon Patricia Hewitt MP, 
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, UK
Economically, environmentally and socially, our world is being
transformed. No business can now work — if it ever could —
in isolation from the wider society in which it operates. And so
the challenges our world faces are part of the business climate
not just of tomorrow, but today.
A strong society and a strong economy are two sides of the
same coin. Responsible businesses are successful businesses
— as those companies who are already making corporate
responsibility (CR) key to their strategy will testify. That’s why
CR is not an add-on but a core part of the DTI’s business
strategy, contributing to our aim of prosperity for all.
When a business loses trust and legitimacy it is likely to lose
also the loyalty of its customers, its employees and its
investors. For this reason investors too are coming to see CR
not just in terms of cost or even avoidance of risk, but as value
added, and responsible investment as sound investment.
Calls for fundamental changes to the legal duties of company
directors or pension fund trustees therefore miss the point.
Successful companies are needed to produce the innovation,
jobs and growth essential to achieving sustainable
development in both developed and developing markets. 
At the same time they will deliver the financial returns on which
their shareholders — and the beneficial owners of these
holdings such as future pensioners — and their current
employees depend.
Clearly there is a need for investors and those who manage
their funds to have a better understanding of the factors
affecting a company’s performance, including social,
environmental and ethical issues. This is the thinking behind
the Operating and Financial Review which all UK quoted
companies are to be required to publish.
We want to see investors taking an active interest not just in
how well a company performs, but why — and raising
concerns where they see problems. Some will vote with their
feet and sell where they see a company failing to tackle market
risks or suffering reputational damage. But this is not an option
for the many investors who are in it for the long run, or who
track the market, and pension funds in particular.
For this reason, any initiative to promote dialogue and a
common understanding of the issues on the part of the
various players involved can only be beneficial. So I very much
welcome the work which AccountAbility and the World
Economic Forum have done to bring together these different
players — trustees, fund managers, analysts, company
investor relations departments — to explore the issues and
understand better how the others see them. My department
was very pleased to play a part in this by hosting the third and
final roundtable.
This report is a useful summary of the state of the debate.
Though the conclusions and recommendations are of course
the authors’ own, they highlight some important areas for
further work. The UK is already taking action in many of these
areas. For example, in the field of occupational pensions: 
the government established a voluntary code of investment 
principles in 2001, and brought into effect legislation 
requiring funds to disclose their social, environmental and 
ethical policies;
new pensions legislation strengthened the legislative 
requirements on member-nominated trustees, requiring all 
trustees to have appropriate knowledge and understanding
of the principles governing pension scheme investment and
funding — requirements backed by codes of practice.
The investment community itself is responding to the same
trends. The Association of British Insurers’ disclosure guidelines
on socially responsible investment set out basic disclosure
principles to guide institutional shareholders in engaging with
companies in which they invest. The stock exchange has
launched an initiative to consolidate the many different
questionnaires used by analysts, rating agencies and indices 
to assess the corporate responsibility of a company. 
The “questionnaire fatigue” which this is designed to tackle 
is itself evidence of the growing interest in these issues 
by investors.
We may not yet have all the answers to creating long term,
sustainable— in all senses of the word — business and
investment. I believe, though, that the answers lie not in
rethinking business and investment from scratch, but in the
kind of improvements in knowledge and practice which are
discussed in this report. I welcome the report and the process
that has led up to it as a contribution to the debate.
A u t h o r s
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Simon Zadek, Mira Merme, and Richard Samans are the
report’s lead authors. 
Simon Zadek is Chief Executive of AccountAbility, a Senior
Fellow at Harvard University, and has worked with numerous
major corporations in the strategic development of their
approaches to corporate responsibility. Simon has authored
numerous books, reports and articles on corporate
responsibility, including “The Civil Corporation and Tomorrow’s
History”. (simon@accountability.org.uk) 
Mira Merme is Senior Associate at AccountAbility with many
years experience in development finance and until recently ran
a group of publicly listed companies. Mira has authored
various reports and articles on corporate responsibility,
including her co-authorship of an AccountAbility report,
“Redefining Materiality”. (mira@accountability.org.uk) 
Richard Samans is Managing Director of the World Economic
Forum’s Global Institute for Partnership and Governance.
(gcci@weforum.org)
Three specialist chapters have been written on financial
analysts, pension funds and fund management, respectively
by Francis Condon, Stephen Davis and Mehdi Mahmud.
Francis Condon is the Head of European Steel Research, ABN
AMRO Equities2. Francis has 16 years of experience as an
equity analyst following six years with Prudential Assurance
Corporation and ten years on the sell-side with ABN AMRO. In
August 2004, Francis moved over to ABN AMRO's
sustainable development team in Amsterdam.
(francis.condon@nl.abnamro.com)
Stephen Davis, PhD, is president of Davis Global Advisors
(DGA), the leading consultancy specializing in international
corporate governance and publisher of the weekly “Global
Proxy Watch” bulletin. His forthcoming book, The Civil
Economy — co-authored with Jon Lukomnik and David Pitt-
Watson — forecasts market architecture. He is a co-founder
and former governor of the International Corporate
Governance Network and founding partner of
GovernanceMetrics International and g3, a corporate
governance advisory firm working with the World Bank Group.
(www.davisglobal.com)
Mehdi Mahmud is Executive Vice-President at Jennison
Associates, a US investment firm. He is responsible for the
investment oversight of the firm's “Value, Blend, and Small-
Cap” equity capabilities. Mehdi is also responsible for setting
the strategic direction of the firm. Previously, Mehdi was a
portfolio manager at J.P. Morgan Investment Management,
and served as deputy to the Global Chief Investment Officer at
Credit Suisse Asset Management.
(mehdi_mahmud@yahoo.com)
AccountAbility
AccountAbility is an international, non-profit membership
organization developing and advocating approaches to
accountability that promote sustainable development. Based
in London since its formation in 1995, it has led in the
development of corporate responsibility standards.
AccountAbility undertakes leading edge research in such
diverse fields as partnership and NGO governance and
accountability, responsible lobbying, and national
competitiveness and corporate responsibility.
(www.AccountAbility.org.uk)
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Responsible investing is most commonly understood to mean
investing in a manner that takes into account the impact of
investments on wider society and the natural environment,
both today and in the future. The most visible manifestation of
this aspect of responsibility has been so-called ‘socially
responsible investment’ (SRI). Initially confined to the negative
screening of investment funds managed on behalf of specific
religious communities, or targeted at a narrow range of
specific issues such as apartheid South Africa, the last decade
has seen an extraordinary growth in the scale and breadth of
application of SRI. There is over US$ 2 trillion under
professional management in the United States linked to some
kind of socially responsible investment strategies, a fourfold
growth over the last decade3.
However, the logic of responsible investment — i.e., the
deliberate incorporation of material social and environmental
considerations in investment decision-making — has yet to be
embraced by the wider investment community. Responsible
investing remains a boutique segment of the industry despite
widespread, if largely anecdotal, evidence that social and
environmental factors affect market valuations both positively
and negatively. 
Most obvious are instances with direct legal consequences.
ABB, for example, is one of many companies facing massive
liabilities associated with asbestos. The financial markets
discounted Wal-Mart’s normally buoyant share price on news
of the class action related alleged discriminatory labour
practices. Market shifts associated with changing societal
concerns are ignored at a company’s risk. McDonald’s,
responding late but forcefully to obesity and broader health
concerns, was duly rewarded with a rise in profits and share
price. Broader political risk can be rooted in the dynamics of
progressive social change. Sasol’s SEC 2003 filing highlights
the slow pace of black economic empowerment as a
significant risk that may adversely affect the business,
operating results, cash flows and financial condition. Similarly,
recent poor performance in Europe of leading US retail brands
has been attributed by some business commentators to
broader international disenchantment with the US. More
positively, shares in Brazil’s top cosmetics group, Natura,
offering mid-range products grounded in strong social and
environmental credentials, soared upwards on their debut on
the Brazilian stock market in June 2004.
Despite these and other examples, attention to non-financial
factors within the wider investment community remains largely
reactive and episodic. What could propel responsible investing
from the boutique to the mainstream? Based on three
roundtable discussions involving mainstream investment fund
managers, analysts, trustees and advisors convened in 2003-
04 by the World Economic Forum’s Global Corporate
Citizenship Initiative and AccountAbility, the answer is likely to
be found in the major demographic changes sweeping most
advanced industrialized countries and transforming the nature
of corporate share ownership.
The New Landscape of Corporate Share Ownership
Today, beneficial owners — those who will ultimately benefit
from share ownership of large corporations — are no longer
the wealthy privileged few. Particularly in Northern Europe,
North America and Japan, but increasingly on a global basis,
the beneficial owners are now the huge majority of working
people who have their pensions and other life savings invested
in shares of the world’s largest companies. The biggest two
shareholding bodies in Britain, for instance, are the British
Telecom and the mineworkers pension schemes. In Denmark
it’s the workers’ pension fund, the civil service fund in Holland,
the public employees of California in the United States, and in
Canada, the teachers and civil servants of Ontario. Each of
these funds holds a small share of literally thousands of
companies. Further, it isn’t just that domestic funds own the
companies in their own nation. Increasingly, funds have an
ever-larger proportion of their equity invested internationally.
Quite literally then, these and other such funds constitute the
majority ownership of our corporate world. Each pensioner
owns a tiny interest in vast numbers of companies. From the
telecoms of Panama to the chemical companies of Germany,
Mainstreaming Responsible Investment
The Global Corporate Citizenship Initiative of the World Economic
Forum, in association with AccountAbility, organized a series of
discussions during 2003-04, with corporate and investment
community executives, as well as other experts:
“To improve understanding of concrete impediments to and
opportunities for broader integration of social and environmental
aspects of corporate performance in mainstream investment 
policies and practices.”
The initiative’s core aim has been to identify specific obstacles to
wider incorporation of non-financial considerations in the valuation
and investment strategies of major institutional investors. These
discussions also sought to explore possible changes in policies 
and practices that could ‘tip’ systemic change in the investment
community in this direction.
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from the electronics companies of Silicon Valley to the oil wells
of Nigeria, millions of citizens are the beneficial owners.
Most individual participants in pension plans, mutual funds,
and insurance companies are investing to provide for their
retirement or other long-term financial needs. In this sense, the
widespread benchmarking within the fund management
industry against short-term performance benchmarks that fail
to take account of social, ethical, and environmental aspects
of corporate performance is increasingly out of step with
underlying client interests. Social and environmental factors
can be quite significant drivers of longer term financial
performance, particularly through their influence on the
enabling environment for business operations and investment.
In the long run, the vitality of markets is influenced greatly by
prevailing legal, regulatory and macroeconomic conditions,
which ultimately reflect policy — i.e., political — choices made
by democratic societies. While a serious problem or major
opportunity associated with the environmental or social
performance of a particular business model may not manifest
itself in the short term, it may well show up in financial results
and market valuation over time as consumers, regulators,
voters or plaintiffs lose confidence and respond accordingly.
Investment is first and foremost about meeting the needs of
the owners of capital. If the real owners of most of the capital
in today’s markets are mainly the intended beneficiaries of the
pension funds, mutual funds and insurance companies, then
the responsibility of these investors will increasingly be to meet
the intrinsic interests of pension plan participants and
insurance policyholders in not only competitive near-term
returns, but also the long-term vitality of their countries’
economies, societies and environments. This will require the
deliberate incorporation of material social and environmental
aspects of corporate performance in investment analysis and
decision making, grounded in:
1) full appreciation of the rights and long-term interests of the 
ultimate beneficiaries of funds that typically have very 
long-term liabilities; and
2) broad understanding of the factors, such as social and 
environmental considerations, that could influence returns 
over the long term.
In this important sense, it is the transformation of share
ownership by rapidly aging populations in most industrialized
countries that is fundamentally altering our conception of
responsible investment and potentially driving it into the
mainstream financial community, in ways that the founders of
the original SRI funds might not have imagined possible.
The Systemic Nature of the Challenge
That the investment value chain (e.g., pension/mutual funds,
advisors, asset management firms, analysts, etc.) as a whole
does not factor in social and environmental issues is not most
usefully understood in terms of the personal values of its
participants. It arises because of today’s blend of available
information, participant competencies and, most of all,
institutionalized incentives that drive behaviour. These factors
combine in creating the perception that significant competitive
disadvantage will befall any one player that strays from
customary practice. That is, the development of responsible
investment is impeded by a classic “prisoner’s dilemma” in
which it is in no one’s interest to take the first step alone in
making changes, notwithstanding that all players could
benefit.
Fund managers point to the role of their clients in driving their
focus on short-term performance. As one fund manager
argued, “As long as client [e.g., pension fund trustees]
mandates require us to deliver performance benchmarked
against short-term market tracker indexes, we will of course
remain short-term in our outlook.” Analysts, similarly, argued
that they could rarely advance social and environmental
performance issues so long as their clients, fund managers,
were only concerned with drivers of short-term performance
and market valuations. One analyst summarized his
experience thus, “Strategic research on future social and
environmental risks and opportunities got me my five minutes
of fame. But there were no buyers for the work, and this is
what counts at the end of the day. Given the choice again, if I
want to stay in business, I would not do such research.”
Such behaviour in financial markets has a tangible impact on
the real economy. One extensive study found that, “Because
of the severe market reaction to missing an earnings target,
firms are willing to sacrifice economic value in order to meet a
short run earnings target…. The preference for smooth
earnings is so strong that 78% of the surveyed executives
would give up economic value in exchange for smooth
earnings.… We find that 55% of managers would avoid
initiating a very positive [Net Present Value] project if it meant
falling short of the current quarter’s consensus earnings.”
Specific Impediments
Following are some of the most salient impediments to
broader consideration of non-financial factors by the
mainstream investment community, identified by the project’s
three roundtable discussions and further developed in
E x e c u t i v e  S u m m a r y
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chapters of this report, contributed by three distinguished
participants (Mehdi Mahmud, Executive Vice-President of
Jennison Associates; Francis Condon, Head of European
Steel Research, ABN AMRO Equities4; and Stephen Davis,
President of Davis Global Advisers).
Asset management. Fund managers must act in demonstrable
compliance with the performance objective of optimizing
clients’ financial returns, which is typically defined in their
contracts relative to certain benchmark indices, at specific
levels of risk, and/or with respect to pre-defined peer groups.
The need for demonstrable compliance creates a burden of
proof on the part of the fund manager, which at best heightens
managers’ sensitivity towards risk-taking and at worst
encourages inertia around “tried and true” approaches that are
easily defensible. This high level of regulatory awareness and
scrutiny, combined with the widespread use of benchmark
indices and clients’ gradually shrinking time horizons for
performance evaluation, is a powerful driver of conservatism
among fund managers with respect to innovation. Today,
these indices are ubiquitous, so much so that what began as
a means of more rigorously measuring fund managers’
performance has gradually become a constraint on fund
managers’ discretion. While there are exceptions, the empirical
evidence is that the average manager’s propensity to assume
risk relative to their respective benchmarks (a statistical
measure called tracking error) has declined over time, leading
to greater clustering of fund managers’ returns. As the time
horizon for evaluating performance has gradually shortened,
investment management companies have evolved their
business models accordingly. The time horizon for business
planning has shrunk, with many companies aggressively
managing their line-up of products to meet evolving demands
in the marketplace. As business planning and compensation
practices go hand in hand, it is not surprising the
compensation practices in the industry have evolved towards
shorter-term performance. If left unchecked, this is likely to
further encourage clustering of fund managers’ performance
around narrowly defined benchmarks and discourage
adoption of broader, longer-term perspectives in fund
managers’ investment decisions.
Investment analysis. The broad philosophy of responsible
investment has made little headway among most mainstream
equity analysts. This reluctance to move the research time
horizon beyond the foreseeable and the quantifiable
represents a concern that such analysis falls short of being
“commercial”. Three major impediments are: (1) the current
data set of performance indicators does not yet add up to a
consistent whole (i.e., company data on social and
environmental performance is patchy, often unaudited and
lacking in historical benchmarks); (2) there is limited ability
among the current population of investment analysts, and new
analysts are receiving too little training in the use of non-
financial criteria in financial valuation; and (3) the way that sell-
side equity analysts are paid represents a significant
disincentive to challenging this situation. On the buy-side,
research analysts who have spent years honing their analytical
skills and industry knowledge — and are therefore at peak
levels of preparedness to perform truly differentiating
investment research on companies’ long-term business
models — are typically removed from specialist roles and
placed into more generalist fund management positions where
there is less scope to apply such skills and knowledge.
Pension funds. The greatest impediment to the ability of
pension plans to reflect the inherently long-term investment
horizon of their participants is perhaps the one most deeply
embedded in their own architecture. Most funds fail to meet
the bedrock governance standards they increasingly demand
of companies. This can most clearly be seen in the principal
ways in which accountability and transparency fall short. For
example, savers can only rarely discover how their funds are
managed. They normally have no voice in how the funds
operate or who makes key fund decisions. Corporate funds
and employee stock plans in many jurisdictions are entirely or
largely controlled by company management. Boards of
trustees of pension schemes generally do not operate as
professional oversight bodies. Recent probes in the US, UK
and the Netherlands have exposed many of the flaws. Most
trustees are not getting trained, spend too little time on the
job, communicate too little with scheme members and ignore
shareowner activism and socially responsible investment,
according to a Consensus Research report for the UK
Department of Work and Pensions5. They are typically not paid
or given authority comparable to directors at public
companies, and few spend efforts assessing their own
performance or communicating with beneficiaries. In other
cases, particularly those of civil service funds, trustee boards
may be swayed excessively by political factors. Moreover,
intermediaries such as investment advisors, gatekeepers,
consultants and fund managers that link trustees to the
investment process typically dominate trustee decision-
making. Finally, too many funds rigidly split the functions of
ownership and portfolio trading. The responsibilities to vote
shares and monitor social, ethical and environmental (SEE)
and governance may often fall into a compliance or legal
division, while professionals doing the buying and selling of
shares are rarely encouraged to gain knowledge and
experience in the ways in which SEE and governance affect
risk and performance of particular companies.
E x e c u t i v e  S u m m a r y
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Opportunities for Progress 
Responsible investment requires an orientation towards
strategies that optimize long-term returns, both because this
delivers better financial returns over the time profile that
interests intended beneficiaries, and because over these
periods social and environmental issues become more material
and so can be better considered. Realigning fund management
towards the longer-term performance of their investees requires
a host of measures, embracing changes in incentives,
competencies and available information. Following is a
summary of recommendations emanating from the roundtable
discussions and chapters contributed by expert participants:
Modify Incentives
Establish an international set of good governance principles for
pension funds — a voluntary Fund Governance Code? that
ensures accountability (disclosure of votes, policies, and
management relationships) and professionalism (training,
representation) on the part of boards of trustees. The aim of
these principles would be to ensure the representation of long-
term beneficiary interests in intent, capability and practice.
Modify pension fiduciary rules which discourage or prohibit 
explicit trustee consideration of social and environmental aspects
of corporate performance.
Increase the average duration of asset manager mandates to 
lend momentum to current experimentation with fund manager
compensation arrangements linked to superior long-term
performance.
Increase disclosure of fund manager compensation structures to 
encourage better linkage between pay and long-term performance.
Develop new business models for research on non-financial
issues by analysts and incorporate this into the current regulatory
review of the sell-side analyst function in diversified investment
houses. 
Require analysis of material non-financial factors to be included
in pension fund mandates to asset managers.
Re-evaluate the relationship and relative organizational standing 
of buy-side analysts and portfolio managers in order to cultivate 
a more attractive long-term career path for analysts, allowing for 
the accumulation of necessary expertise. 
Develop new performance assessment models that enable 
trustees to support long-term investment strategies while 
complying with fiduciary obligations.
Build Competencies
Pay, train, and empower pension fund trustees more like 
corporate directors in order to increase the capacity of boards of 
trustees to exercise independent judgement in the long-term 
interests of beneficiaries.
Create a specific professional competency for non-financial 
analysis either through increased training of existing investment 
analysts or the establishment of a new category of specialists.
Increase the emphasis on non-financial aspects of corporate 
performance in graduate business schools and mid-career 
analyst educational programmes.
Improve Information 
Improve the consistency of the content, collection and assurance
of material non-financial information.
Refine the concept of materiality and the basis for measuring and
communicating its application to the links between financial 
performance and social and environmental performance.
Expand the dialogue between analysts and corporate investor 
relations officers on the need for greater consistency in the 
content, collection and assurance of non-financial information.
E x e c u t i v e  S u m m a r y
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Extending the Dialogue
It became apparent through the course of the project that
considerable value could be realized by deepening the
dialogue among companies, pension trustees, advisors, fund
managers, analysts, policymakers and independent experts on
many of the impediments and opportunities for progress cited
above. Many promising areas for continued discussion and
research are posed by the following questions:
What might an international set of voluntary principles for 
good governance of pension funds contain?
Which jurisdictions would benefit by a change in fiduciary 
guidelines to provide greater scope for consideration by 
trustees of social, ethical, and environmental 
considerations, and how should such changes be 
structured for maximum benefit and minimum effect on 
existing legal structures?
What new business models for non-financial research by 
the buy- or sell-side are possible, perhaps driven by 
changes in the mandates provided by pension funds to 
asset managers?
How could compensation arrangements for portfolio 
managers be modified to encourage increased focus on 
long-term performance, and what conditions would be 
need to be present for such practices to become more 
commonplace within the industry?
How might a professional competency in non-financial 
issues be developed more fully within the investment 
analyst community?
How could the content, assurance, and collection of 
corporate non-financial information be improved so that it 
would be of greater utility to investment analysts?
What new performance assessment models and strategic 
management tools (integrating social and environmental 
factors) show particular promise?
What does the responsible investment debate imply for 
investment in debt and derivative instruments?
Integrating social and environmental considerations into the
investment decision process is slowly moving from an
incidental activity to one that is integral to the fundamental
changes sweeping the investment world. It is increasingly
central to an appreciation of the interests of the tens of millions
of individual participants in pension funds, mutual funds and
life insurance policies who now comprise the bulk of share
ownership and, by extension, the future role of financial
markets in supporting global economic growth and social
progress. The World Economic Forum’s Global Corporate
Citizenship Initiative and AccountAbility look forward to the
opportunity to continuing this vitally important discussion.
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During 2003 – 2004, the Global Corporate Citizenship Initiative
of the World Economic Forum, in association with
AccountAbility, organized a series of discussions with
corporate and investment community executives as well as
other experts:
To improve understanding of concrete impediments to and
opportunities for broader integration of social and
environmental aspects of corporate performance in
mainstream investment policies and practices.
The initiative’s core aim has been to identify specific obstacles
to wider incorporation of non-financial considerations in the
valuation and investment strategies of major institutional
investors. These discussions also sought to explore possible
changes in policies and practices that could “tip” systemic
change in the investment community toward this direction.
The learning from the initiative has come from a dialogue
grounded in three roundtables, convening senior
representatives from a cross-section of the investment
community6 together with members of the Global Corporate
Citizenship Initiative and other experts, including key
governmental, labour and academic leaders. This dialogue was
supported by other key initiatives in this field as well as a range
of available research documented in endnotes to this report.
“Mainstreaming Responsible Investment” summarizes
perspectives and issues raised throughout the dialogue,
including specific chapters authored by participants reflecting
perspectives from key elements of the mainstream investment
community: pension funds, fund managers and investment
analysts. The views expressed in this report do not necessarily
reflect the views of individual members of the World Economic
Forum’s Global Corporate Citizenship Initiative or AccountAbility.
The Roundtables
Mainstreaming Responsible Investment, London, July 2003
The first roundtable, hosted by Deutsche Bank, broadly explored
investment community perceptions of the relevance and treatment
of social and environmental aspects of corporate performance. The
discussion focused upon three key factors that could either inhibit or
drive effective change: (a) information; (b) knowledge and
competencies; and (c) incentives. In attendance were 40 senior
representatives from the international investment community and
related institutions, including representatives from major pension
funds (e.g., CalPERS, USS), asset management companies (e.g.,
Goldman Sachs, HBOS), representative and regulatory institutions
(e.g., US Public Accounting Committee Oversight Board,
Association of British Insurers), and business networks (e.g.,
International Business Leaders Forum, World Business Council for
Sustainable Development).
Trustees and Fund Managers, New York, October 2003
The second roundtable, hosted by Swiss Re, explored key
relationships in the “investment value-chain”, notably between
institutions representing the intended beneficiaries and ultimate
owners of capital, and those mandated to invest funds on their
behalf. A particular focus was on embedded incentives that
determine to a great degree the outcome of these relationships. It
was attended by sector representatives of fund management (e.g.,
Citibank, Jennison Associates, Strategic investment Group, Zurich
Financial Services, Barclay Global Investors) and pension fund
trustees and managers (e.g., New York City Employees Retirement
System, New Zealand Superannuations Scheme, NYC Comptrollers
Office, BT Pension Fund), and labour representatives.
Financial Analysts, London, June 2004
The third roundtable, hosted by the Department of Trade and
Industry of the UK government, brought together analysts, fund
managers and corporate investor relations officers to explore how
analysts’ information, competencies, and incentives impact on
valuations and decision-making. The focus was on how analysts,
ratings organisations and investor relations made decisions as to
whether to factor in specific non-financial aspects of performance. It
was attended by executives of fund management/buy-side (e.g.,
Merrill Lynch Asset Management, ISIS, Hermes Focus Asset,
Morgan Stanley and Co, Nomura Asset Management), corporate
investor relations officers (e.g., Novo Nordisk), insurance companies
(e.g., SwissRe, Standard Life) and investment bank/sell-side
analysts (e.g., Merrill Lynch Asset Management, ABN AMRO,
Goldman Sachs).
Note: A full list of participants is included in the annex to this report.
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Broad Context
Business behaviour has always shaped societies as well as
markets. This impact has become more powerful with the
growing role of private business in the delivery of education,
health and other public goods. Pressure on business to adopt
credible, responsible practices has been amplified as part of
the contentious global debate about the role of business in
society and its associated responsibilities. The call for
business to adopt “corporate citizenship” practices embraces
an ever-broadening range of issues, from human rights and
carbon emissions, through to privacy, religious tolerance and
financial responsibilities to pension holders.
The willingness of investors and consumers to both punish
and reward companies for their handling of such issues have
increased the importance of non-financial aspects of
performance in underpinning business success; in short, the
“business case” for responsible practices. From a societal
perspective, the extension of business responsibilities to
account for more than narrow definitions of financial
performance is increasingly seen as crucial in addressing
social and environmental challenges7. 
These business and societal gains are, and rightly must be,
intimately connected. This aim and fact is increasingly
recognized by business and other communities of interest. At
the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting in New York in
2002, for example, CEOs of the Forum’s Global Corporate
Citizenship Initiative issued a joint statement expressing the
view that: 
“Leaders from all countries, sectors and levels of society need
to work together to address these [social and environmental]
challenges by supporting sustainable human development and
ensuring that the benefits of globalization are shared more
widely. It is in the interests of business that these benefits
continue both for companies and for others in society.” 8
Just as other parts of the business community are embracing
corporate citizenship, parts of the mainstream investment
community are beginning to do the same. A survey exploring
the perceived importance of corporate citizenship to key
players in the European investment community was
undertaken during 2003 by Deloitte, and reported in the
Global Corporate Citizenship Initiative’s recent report “Values
and Value: Communicating the Strategic Importance of
Corporate Citizenship to Investors”, completed in association
with the International Business Leaders Forum9. The survey
concluded that a growing proportion of investors, analysts and
investor relations officers viewed social and environmental
issues as of growing importance to business performance and
market value. 
There are varied reasons why the investment community is
waking up to the significance of social and environmental
drivers of investment performance. Core to this is the
consolidation of the industry. Almost –50% of all ordinary
shares listed on the UK’s London Stock Exchange, (worth over
US$ 1 trillion), are owned by insurance companies, pension
funds and other institutional shareholders. This consolidation
of financial services has greatly accelerated interest in the
more effective management of social and environmental
externalities. Insurers are a particular case in point, faced with
risks both as investors and insurer. A recent West LB report
pointed out that claims on insurance companies relating to
losses following 9/11 were in the order of US$ 20 billion, but
that in addition stock market losses of insurance companies,
following 9/11, were in the order of US$ 60 billion10. Richard
Murray, Chief Claims Strategist at Swiss Re, puts the point
firmly in reference to climate change, “We do not wish to do
business with policy holders who are not willing to deal with
issues like this and we are going to be more selective about
who we’ll do business with, bearing that in mind.”
Do social and environmental factors affect returns?
The underlying link between financial returns and how
businesses manage their social and environmental
performance has long been a topic of debate and extensive
research11. Crucially, however, is whether these interests
intersect by impacting directly on share price, or at least are
Context
A. Increasing attention on the importance of business in economic 
development, incorporating respect for its social and 
environmental impact.
B. Concern about the quality of risk assessment in investment 
decisions.
C. Growing recognition that social and environmental performance 
materially affects investment returns.
D. Appeals for “socially responsible investment” to evolve beyond 
its current niche in financial markets. 
E. Emerging public policy discussions about the changing nature 
of corporate and fiduciary responsibility in today’s global 
economy.
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Responsibility Counts
McDonald’s. McDonald’s introduced a range of premium salads 
to sit alongside the fattier fare, pledged to phase out the super-
size portions by the end of 2004 and changed its chicken 
nuggets “formula” to make them white meat only. Jim 
Cantalupo, Chairman and CEO of McDonald’s commented, “We 
are responding to lifestyle issues with an initiative that focuses 
on three important areas: menu choice, physical activity and 
education.” Alongside other changes it was marked by a 56% 
rise in first quarter net profit reported in April 2003. The changes 
doubled the fast food giant’s share price.13
ABB. In 2001, ABB financial statement notes attributed US$ 470
million of its reported total US$ 510 million losses (on a net 
income loss of US$ 610 million) to asbestos-related liabilities. 
However by 30 June 2002, a new 20F filing (Item 5. Operating 
and Financial Review and Prospects Contingencies and 
Retained Liabilities Asbestos Claims) stated there was an 
accrued liability of US$ 1,118 million as of 31 December 2002, 
for resolution of the asbestos-related personal injury claims 
against Combustion Engineering, Lummus and Basic.14
Sasol’s SEC 2003 filing states on future risks that South Africa 
still faces a series of social, political and economic challenges 
which may adversely affect the business, operating results, cash
flows and financial condition. Sasol declares that it cannot 
assure investors that these transactions will take place at fair 
market terms.15
Wal-Mart’s disclosure to the SEC on material changes to the 
business states that: “The California Department of Labor 
Standards Enforcement has initiated an investigation of Wal-
Mart for alleged failures to comply with California wage-and-
hour laws…. If the Court certifies a class in this action and there 
is an adverse verdict on the merits, or in the event of a 
negotiated settlement of the action, the resulting liability could 
be material to the Company, as could employment-related 
injunctive measures, which would result in increased costs of 
operations on an ongoing basis.” 16
Natura Cosmeticos. The shares of Natura Cosmeticos SA 
ordinary shares, Brazil’s top cosmetics group, soared almost 
12% on their debut on the Brazilian stock market in June 2004. 
Unibanco analyst, Ramanho, stated, “From what we can see 
about the company’s history, you really have to search hard to 
find anything negative. Natura was founded in 1969 and sells 
beauty and health products it says use natural ingredients grown
in an ethical and sustainable way.” 17
reported by businesses as price relevant. While there are many
constraints to such an impact, there are a growing numbers of
cases exhibiting such a connection.
The evidence is increasingly clear that these factors count.
Over US$ 2 trillion under professional management in the
United States are linked to some kind of socially responsible
investment strategies, a fourfold growth over the last decade12.
And social and environmental factors are beginning to affect
market valuations. Most obvious are instances with direct legal
consequences. ABB, for example, is one of many companies
facing massive liabilities associated with asbestos. The
financial markets discounted Wal-Mart’s normally buoyant
share price on news of class action related alleged
discriminatory labour practices. Market shifts associated with
changing societal concerns are ignored at a company’s risk.
McDonalds, responding late but forcefully to obesity and
broader health concerns, was duly rewarded with a rise in
profits and share price. Broader political risk can be rooted in
the dynamics of progressive social change. 
Values and Value
Investor relations officers (IROs) believe that good social and 
environmental performance in the long-term strongly influences
a company’s brand and reputation (69%), economic performance 
(46%) and market value (36%). 
For 79% of fund managers and analysts, the management of 
social and environmental risks has a positive impact on a 
company’s long-term market value.
Both fund managers/analysts (52%) and IROs (47%) believe that 
social and environmental considerations will become a significant
aspect of mainstream investment decisions over the next two 
years.
The majority (85%) of IROs are convinced that the next three years
will see more legal requirements imposed on companies for social
and environmental reporting.
Source: “Values and Value: Communicating the Strategic Importance
of Corporate Citizenship to Investors”, World Economic Forum and
International Business Leaders Forum, 2003
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Sasol’s SEC 2003 filing highlights the slow pace of black
economic empowerment as a significant risk that may
adversely affect the business, operating results, cash flows
and financial condition. Similarly, recent poor performance in
Europe of leading US retail brands has been attributed by
some business commentators to broader international
disenchantment with the US. More positively, shares in Brazil’s
top cosmetics group, Natura, offering mid-range products
grounded in strong social and environmental credentials,
soared almost 12% on their debut on the Brazilian stock
market in June 2004. 
These developments, however, have to be balanced against a
background of continued marginalization by the investment
community of most social and environmental issues. As one
analyst commented in one of the roundtables, “We do look at
long-term factors, but they are strictly background to the
dominant variables like free cash flow and, to be frank,
rumours on the street about the company.” A major survey of
UK investors’ attitudes to environmental and social issues
found that less than 5% of financial analysts and fund
managers, when asked (unprompted) what they take into
account when making or recommending investments,
mentioned social and environmental aspects of corporate
performance.18 Similarly, the same survey cited in “Values and
Value” found that the majority of fund managers and analysts
did not believe that social and environmental factors affected
short-term market valuation. That is, even where there is a
growing belief that social and environmental issues do, should
or could count, the fact is that most analysts and fund
managers do not take such factors adequately into account.
This fact is rooted in short-term horizons dominating today’s
financial markets, and associated approaches to valuation and
profit-taking, and reflects a continued resistance to
mainstreaming responsible investment. 
Nevertheless, there is little doubt that investors are taking non-
financial issues more seriously, as a growing number of
leading practitioners, public bodies and thought leaders profile
both the potential and necessity of such a development.
A growing number of financial institutions have declared their
commitment to sustainable development or some variant of
corporate responsibility. For example, twenty major investment
companies ? including Banco do Brasil, Credit Suisse Group,
Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, HSBC and Morgan Stanley
? have endorsed a recent United Nation Global Compact
initiative report19 providing guidance in this respect. Similarly,
the Global Reporting Initiative is working with ten financial
institutions from Australia, Germany, the Netherlands, South
Africa, Switzerland and the UK in developing a sector-specific
reporting supplement.
An Emerging Responsible Investment Movement?
The “Responsible Investment Initiative” was launched in mid-2004
by the United Nations Environment Programme Finance Initiative
(UNEP FI), with investors proposing a global alliance to guide
responsible investment best practice. Twelve firms from the asset
management sector have committed to developing the ability of
mainstream fund managers to identify and respond to social and
environmental issues relevant to their profession. (http://unepfi.net)
The World Business Council for Sustainable Development
(WBCSD)’s “Capital for Change” guide for investors aims to support
sustainable livelihood business activities that serve the needs of the
poor and contribute to companies. “Finding capital for sustainable
livelihoods businesses” advises companies to shift their financing
strategy from a “centralized” capital strategy, which primarily
involves commercial banks, to a “distributed” capital strategy.
(www.wbcsd.com)
Twenty major investment companies have endorsed a recent United
Nation Global Compact publication “Who Cares Wins —
Connecting Financial Markets to a Changing World” on connecting
financial markets to environmental, social and governance criteria,
and agreed on how these factors would become standard
components in the analysis of corporate performance and
investment decision-making. (www.unglobalcompact.org)
The Equator Principles represents an industry approach for financial
institutions in determining, assessing and managing environmental
and social risk in project financing, and has been signed by 27
major banking institutions. (www.equator-principles.com) 
Fannie Mae Initiative - More than US$ 80 million has been
committed for local anti-predatory initiatives in cities across the
country, as part of a responsible lending strategy.
(www.fanniemae.com)
The Investors’ Right-to-Know campaign asks US mutual funds to
voluntarily publicly disclose their proxy voting polices and voting
records, in order to make mutual funds more accountable and lead
to a stronger corporate governance process that balances the
interests of all stakeholders – stockholders.
(www.responsiblewealth.org)
The Corporate Library evaluates “board effectiveness” based on
indicators of special interest to shareholders and investors, to
determine which boards are most likely to enhance and preserve
shareholder value and which boards might actually increase
investor risk. (www.thecorporatelibrary.com)
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lost an estimated US$ 311 billion23. Worse still, the precipitous
losses in 401k accounts in the early years of the new
millennium were, according to one reputable source quoted in
The New York Times, attributable as much to poor investment
decisions as to the decline in the US stock market24. 
Responsible investing is more commonly understood to mean
investing in a manner that takes into account the impact of
investments on wider society and the natural environment,
both today and in the future. The most visible manifestation of
this aspect of responsibility has been referred to as “socially
responsible investment” (SRI). Initially confined to the negative
screening of investment funds managed on behalf of specific
religious communities or targeted at a narrow range of specific
issues such as apartheid South Africa, the last decade has
seen an extraordinary growth in the scale and breadth of
application of SRI. The US-based Social Investment Forum’s
bi-annual report on “Socially Responsible Investing Trends” (for
2003) states that US$ 2.16 trillion under professional
management in the United States is linked to some kind of
socially responsible investment strategies. This is nearly four
times the US$ 639 billion the Forum identified in 199525, or
about 12% of the US$ 19.2 trillion in investment assets under
management in the US estimated in the 2003 Nelson’s
Directory of Investment Managers26. 
Screened “socially responsible funds” have been a crucially
important development, but need to be understood as part of
a broader landscape of responsible investment. Responsibility
is first to the owners of capital, affording them the right to
make decisions as to the application of their property within
the law. These choices may remain narrowly based on
financial considerations, framed by preferred time periods and
selected trade-offs between risk and reward. However, they
may and often do include non-financial considerations.
Indeed, the connection between financial and non-financial
performance may ultimately prove to be of greatest
significance, because social and environmental factors can be
important drivers of longer-term financial performance through
their influence on the enabling environment for business
operations and investment. In the long run, the vitality of
markets is influenced greatly by prevailing legal, regulatory and
macroeconomic conditions, which ultimately reflect
political/policy choices made by democratic societies. While a
serious problem with the environmental or social sustainability
of a particular business model may not manifest itself in the
short run, it may well demonstrate itself in financial results and
market valuation over time as consumers, regulators, voters or
plaintiffs lose confidence and react accordingly.
What Is Responsible Investment?
Investment is first and foremost about meeting the needs of
the owners of capital. The single largest portion of invested
funds today is associated with pension liabilities; therefore,
responsible investing must begin by ensuring that these
liabilities to current and future retirees, most of whom will not
retire for another 20 years or so, will be met. However, the
public is losing confidence in those who have historically been
responsible for delivering acceptable income levels to older
people. An opinion poll by Market & Opinion Research
International (MORI) in the UK found that two-thirds of
respondents did not trust companies to deliver on their
pension commitments. Similarly, an international study
released by the Principal Financial Group found that only 5%
of respondents thought that their governments were
adequately guaranteeing financial security for retirees20. 
Such views are fuelled in part by reports of companies seeking
to shed substantial portions of their pension obligations21. A
recent study by UBS, for example, estimates that pension
fund shortfalls for the top 500 US companies amounted to a
staggering US$ 278 billion at the end of 200322. The New York
State and City pension funds lost a combined US$ 16 billion
during the period 2001-2002. Over that same period, the
average 50-year-old American lost almost US$ 11,000 out of
a 401k balance of US$ 92,000, and the 39.6 million
Americans with 401k accounts who were aged 30 and over
The Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies (CERES)
represents a network of over 80 organizations including
environmental groups, investors, advisors and analysts representing
over US$ 400 billion in invested capital, public interest and
community groups endorsing the CERES Principles. (www.ceres.org)
Tomorrow’s Company’s “Restoring Trust: Investment in the 21st
Century” makes recommendations for voluntary initiatives for
change, based on consultation and research led by a team of 20 top
UK business and financial leaders, including interviews and
workshops with over 500 investment professionals.
(www.tomorrowscompany.com)
The Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP), a group of institutional
investors representing assets in excess of US$ 10 trillion, launched
its report on climate change and shareholder value. The report, by
Innovest Strategic Value Advisors, is based on responses to CDP’s
second information request to the FT500 Global Index of
companies. (www.cdproject.net)
T h e  S t a t e  o f  R e s p o n s i b l e  I n v e s t m e n t
18
Thus, in financial markets increasingly dominated by
institutional investors, who intermediate the pension savings of
plan participants having inherently long-term investment
horizons, responsible investment requires the deliberate
incorporation of material social and environmental aspects of
corporate performance in investment analysis and decision
making. It relies on:
a full appreciation of the rights and long-term interests of 
the ultimate beneficiaries of funds that typically have very 
long-term liabilities; and
broad understanding of the factors, such as social and 
environmental considerations, that could influence returns 
over the long-term.  
If the real owners of most of the capital in today’s markets are
mainly the intended beneficiaries of the pension and mutual
funds, then responsible investing requires Graham’s edict to
be viewed in a new light. The investor’s responsibility will
increasingly be to meet the intrinsic interests of pension plan
participants and insurance policyholders in not only
competitive near-term returns, but also the long-term vitality of
their countries’ economies, societies and environments. In this
important sense, it is the transformation of share ownership by
rapidly aging populations in most industrialized countries that
is fundamentally altering our conception of responsible
investment and driving it into the mainstream financial
community in ways that the founders of the original SRI funds
might not have imagined possible.
Traditions of Responsible Investment
Benjamin Graham, in his well-respected book The Intelligent Investor,
distinguishes the investor from the speculator: ”An investment
operation is one which, upon thorough analysis, promises safety of
principal and an adequate return. Operations not meeting these
requirements are speculative.“
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The New York taxi driver (“day trader”) and Warren Buffet’s
Berkshire Hathaway are both investors. But beyond the
headline, they share little in common. The day trader adopts
essentially an arbitrage strategy, seeking to gain from very
short term price movements. Berkshire Hathaway, on the
other hand, seeks to invest in undervalued but well-managed
companies with strong fundamental growth prospects or in
under-managed but otherwise promising companies whose
performance could be boosted through an improvement in
strategy or competencies.
Debating what “investors” think or want or do is therefore
unhelpful without first identifying which classes of investors are
under the microscope. Opinion surveys, for example, that set out
“what investors think” without carefully distinguishing between
very divergent investor interests are essentially meaningless
and counter-productive. This is as true when the topic is “likely
market movements” as it is concerning the relevance of social
and environmental issues in the investment decision.
But not all differences are equal. The day trader, for example,
will rarely have any interest in a company’s long-term business
strategy, whereas a long-term player like Hermes will have little
interest in short-term price changes save where they portend
deeper and longer-term movements. Similarly, the need to
distinguish investor classes is particularly important when it
comes to most social and environmental issues. Investors with
a short-term focus will tend to be uninterested in such
matters, save where there are regulatory, or immediate and
catastrophic reputational implications. Investors with a longer-
term perspective, on the other hand, might be more
concerned with the impact of social and environmental issues
on business performance, but respond to such information in
diverse ways, depending on their size or investment strategy.
For our purposes, we have distinguished three broad
investment modes, each of which implies distinct approaches
to the matter of “responsibility”.
Transactional Responsible Investing
“Transactional Responsible Investing” is a term coined to
encompass an approach to investment where social and
environmental assessment is applied only within a short-term
trading strategy. Transactional investing is common to both the
small day trader and the bulk of institutional investors, albeit in
different ways. The former is, quite literally, making daily
“freestyle” decisions about where to place limited funds. The
latter are transactional in the sense that they focus on building
and managing indexed portfolios, often covering large parts of
the “investible universe”, where trading decisions that change
the balance of stocks held within portfolios are effectively
governed by short-term market movements that impact the
index. The average length of time which US mutual funds own
individual shares has fallen to a record low of 10 months,
compared to an average hold of 7 years in the 1950s28. This
latter investment approach, somewhat ironically, is termed
“perpetual investing”.
Transactional responsible investing has until recently been
largely underpinned by retail consumer demands to take into
account aspects of non-financial performance. This classically
leads to the exclusion of “sin stocks” (alcohol, tobacco,
weapons, etc.), but can have geographic implications, such as
the avoidance of investments in South Africa during the
apartheid period by the likes of California Public Employees’
Retirement System (CalPERS), or similarly their decision not to
invest in Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines and Malaysia
because of their perception of systemic human rights problems. 
Screening has been used where trustees have had clarification
that this is not contrary to fiduciary duty. The traditional view is
that the remit of a trustee must be to maximize financial
returns, and so does not allow for a restriction of investment
criteria that might impact on performance in these terms29.
Typically, fiduciary duties are framed in the following manner,
although there are variations between different jurisdictions:
“The primary responsibility of fiduciaries is to run the plan
solely in the interest of participants and beneficiaries and for
the exclusive purpose of providing benefits and paying plan
Responsible Investment Modes
Transactional: where social and environmental assessment is 
applied only within a short-term trading strategy
Stewardship: where the investor engages with corporate 
management in order to influence and improve corporate 
governance, social and environmental impacts and financial 
performance
Universal: where the investor takes account of externalities 
arising from the activities of both their own and other investees’ 
activities as material to their own performance
“When pension funds say they are long-term investors, what they
mean is that they have rolling investments in largely indexed linked
funds. To speak accurately, this makes them perpetual investors
making short-term investments, forever.”
Simon Zadek, Chief Executive, AccountAbility27
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expenses”30. Interpretations of what constitutes prudent
investment behaviour are constantly evolving, however these
have, in general, been taken to mean a focus on financial
returns.
Transactional investment strategies linked to social and
environmental screens have in recent years grown in interest to
the mainstream investment community. This is partly because
of the growth in retail consumer demand. But beyond this, it
has become more apparent that the research underlying many
SRI screens can be an effective element of a risk assessment
strategy and practice. The collapse of Railtrack in the UK, for
example, came as a shock to many mainstream investors.
Interestingly, many ”ethical funds” that had historically invested
in railways as an appropriate form of transport had already
withdrawn their investments from this company, due to
interpretations of its poor record in addressing a range of
social and economic issues. More generally, there is a growing
recognition that SRI-oriented investment research can reveal
aspects of risk not adequately captured or analysed by
mainstream analysts. Similarly, concerns expressed by the SRI
community over traditional mainstream safe-havens such as
tobacco, alcohol (and most recently pharmaceuticals and
food) have all proved significant in predicting the actualization
of societal concerns into material risk.
Stewardship Responsible Investing
“Stewardship Responsible Investing” is where the investor
engages with corporate management in order to influence and
improve corporate governance, and thereby impact on social
and environmental as well as financial performance.
Engagement in this sense refers to “active investors” who
makes full use of the rights of ownership in order to exert
influence on the company’s policies, whether through
resolutions proposed at annual shareholders’ meetings or
through a regular constructive dialogue with the company’s
management. This approach is usually effective only when
leverage or a specific critical mass can be achieved. Therefore,
this strategy becomes most effective when implemented by
institutional rather than individual investors. Best-of-sector
type approaches are gaining in popularity, using positive
engagement, and screening and investment/divestment as
sources of leverage. 
Stewardship strategies increase the degree to which social
and environmental factors are taken into account in different
ways:
Business risks and opportunities are more closely 
associated with social and environmental factors over 
longer periods of time.
Long-term engagement increases the investor’s 
understanding of these risks and opportunities and how 
they best might be mitigated or capitalized upon.
Active engagement with corporate management increases 
awareness of, and competencies in, dealing with social and
environmental factors.
“It’s all about shareowning as opposed to shareholding —
ownership is both a right and a duty…”
Mark Anson, CIO, CalPERS31
Long-term investment is clearly a key ingredient of influencing
corporate behaviour and enhancing shareholder value. Long-
term investment as a means of enhancing shareholder value is
not a new concept. Berkshire Hathaway’s long-stated goal is to
maximize the average annual rate of gain in intrinsic business
value on a per-share basis. Berkshire Hathaway outperformed
the Standard and Poor’s (S&P) index from 1952 to 1995, in all
but three years32. The exceptional returns of Berkshire Hathway,
whose long-term engaged investment approach has been
acknowledged, belies the view that short-term gains must be
more beneficial than long-term investment strategies.
This type of approach also underpins, for example, the
Australian Eco Share Fund managed by Westpac Investment
Management33, Friends Provident and Schroeder, and others,
which similarly use their power as shareholders in proxy voting
and discussions with the investees, to encourage companies
directly in the promotion of more socially and environmentally
responsible practices. From each single sector or industrial
group, the best companies, in relative terms according to
corporate social responsibility (CSR) criteria, are identified and
included in the portfolio. This method uses conventional,
benchmark-oriented investment research and portfolio
optimization methods. The degree to which the “best-in-class”
principle is applied determines the risk diversification potential.
Differences can be substantial, for instance between Dow
Jones Sustainability Indices and the FTSE4Good criteria, for
excluding and including stocks. There are difficulties in the
best-in-class approach such as the special need for
communication and explanation associated with the selection
of certain stocks. For example, it is frequently asked how one
can justify the inclusion of oil or tobacco companies in a
sustainability index. As the portion of SRI funds under
management increases it becomes increasingly problematic
for major investors to divest themselves of companies with
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poor policies where engagement has not produced the
necessary changes.
A stewardship approach to responsible investing also arises
because of legal or other restrictions on funds, with regard to
how they can factor in social and environmental issues. The
UK’s University Superannuation Scheme (USS) makes this
point, “We do not have a religious or social change mandate
or an employer that has a strong reputational reason for
excluding particular companies…. Where participating
employers could be financially responsible for the
consequences of any drop in performance as a result of
ethical screening, the legal advice that USS has received is
that it cannot screen out companies or sectors for non-
financial reasons…. USS is therefore obliged to invest in a
wide spectrum of companies and, because of the size of our
fund, this inevitably involves having holdings in major
international corporations, some of which will be of concern.”34
In other words, USS takes a view that it cannot invest or divest
solely because of a company’s social and environmental
performance. Active engagement, enabled through a
stewardship approach, therefore enables USS to take these
factors into account within its legal mandate.
Universal Investing
“Universal Responsible Investing” describes strategies where
the extended breadth of an investor’s portfolio requires it to
take into account externalities arising from one investment due
to its impacts on others. This third category has conventionally
been associated with strategies of very large investors with
such extensive portfolios that the externalities of one
investment impacts on the performance of others. As Hermes
explains in presenting its tenth Hermes Principle, “It makes
little sense for pension funds to support commercial activity
which creates an equal or greater cost to society by robbing
Peter to pay Paul. Where companies are aware that such
conditions exist, it is appropriate for them to support
measures to align shareholder interests with those of society
at large.”
Universal investing is most obviously relevant to large
investors. As Chief Executive Officer of GovernanceMetrics
and former CEO of Thomson Financial Investor Relations,
Howard Sherman argues, “Many of today’s institutional
investors are so large that selling out a position is not always a
prudent investment choice — the very act of selling can
depress stock prices. Many others invest in indexed funds and
have no choice but to stay invested.”35
The relevance of universal investing is not, however, restricted
to large investors, but arises because of the inter-connectivity
of different investor interests and actions. In 1980 less than
10% of all US households owned mutual funds; by 2000 that
number had grown to 49%, with the Investment Company
Institute estimating that 87.9 million Americans own shares in
mutual funds. Individuals hold about 80% of the money
invested in mutual funds. Between 1990 and 2000, total
assets of mutual funds rose from US$ 1.065 trillion to US$
6.965 trillion. Mutual funds are now among the largest owners
of American corporations36. The 75 largest mutual fund
companies control 44% of the voting power at US companies37. 
This third mode of investment arguably has the greatest
potential for factoring in social and environmental dimensions
of investments, since it grapples with externalities that are less
likely to be counted in either of the other investment classes.
At the same time, the practicality of universal investing clearly
poses enormous challenges. There are significant first-mover
disadvantages to any one investor acting in this manner, since
others could free-ride on the back of their, often costly,
actions. Collective action is therefore likely to be a pre-
condition for universal investing. This could be voluntary, but
this poses the challenge of establishing a basis for
collaboration between investors in a fiercely competitive
industry, mainly focused on short-term returns. Equally,
initiating public policies that effectively enforce common
practice would, and do, meet considerable opposition from
those within the investment community with vested interests in
the status quo.
Hermes – Principle 10: Externalization of Costs
“Companies should support voluntary and statutory measures
which minimize the externalization of costs to the detriment of
society at large…most investors are widely diversified; it makes
little sense for them to support activity by one company which is
damaging to overall economic activity. The ultimate beneficiaries
of most investment activity include the greater part of the adult
population who depend on private pensions and life insurance.”
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Strategies for Responsible Investing
These three modes of investment are not mutually exclusive
and can be, and often are, interdependent. Many institutional
investors find themselves investing in most stocks of large
companies (publicly traded on major stock exchanges)
because of the sheer volume of funds that they have to place.
Most portfolios of this kind are indexed, placing them within
the “transactional” class. In this situation, disinvestment is
clearly an option for isolated cases, but is not a viable model
for widespread application. Such pervasive investing makes
engagement with investees an attractive option and links
together transactional and stewardship investment classes.
Finally, for such large investors as CalPERS and USS, the fact
is that different investments do impact on each other, bringing
the “universal investment” perspective to bear on investment
strategies already involving transactional and stewardship
elements.
Just as they can be combined, the three classes also offer a
“developmental” view on responsible investment. Transactional
investing mainly is concerned with establishing what investors
will not do (i.e., essentially when to “exit”). Stewardship
investing involves the use of the investor’s “voice”, allowing for
closer engagement and, at times, the use of formal
governance pathways to apply pressure for change. Clearly
the stewardship route allows the “exit” possibility to be present
as a background “threat of last resort”; yet the strength of this
approach is evident when investors “stay the course”, working
to enhance the management and overall performance of their
investees. Ultimately, universal investing is likely to be most
effective in handling the most extensive range of social and
environmental externalities (negative and positive) and offers
considerable leverage, certainly together with stewardship and
transactional elements. However in practice, the data, tools
and competencies to undertake universal investing in a
systematic manner are often lacking in the mainstream
investment community, a point to be further discussed below.
Conditions for “Universal Investment”
Action by groups of investors, who together see opportunities 
for mitigating risks associated with their collective investing 
activities; for example, initiatives such as the Equator 
Principles, the Investors Network on Climate Risks, and the 
Pharma Investor Group.
Action by individual investors that see a market opportunity in 
embracing a broader, responsible investing strategy, such as 
the high profile positions taken by the likes of CalPERS and 
Insight Investments.
Public policies designed to enhance the delivery of public 
goods (e.g., environmental and civil security) through 
enforcement of investor practices that internalize specific social
and environmental costs.
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The Investment Value Chain
The “investment value chain” comprises the people,
institutions, processes, corporate and regulatory policies that
impact the value derived from investments, and its distribution.
The investment value chain involves a myriad of actors. At one
end are the real owners of capital, or the “intended
beneficiaries” in the case of pension and mutual funds; at the
other are the investees themselves? largely businesses, with
their processes of value creation and its distribution. The
investment value chain is, therefore, more than what is
traditionally understood as “the capital markets”, and includes
other players that impact the investment process and its
outcome, such as public institutions.
We refer to a “chain” however the investment value creation
process is far from a linear process that moves funds
seamlessly from owners to users. The investment value chain
has evolved organically, not through any overall design, and
therefore embodies many overlapping and at times confusing
roles, including some that embed problematic tensions and
conflicts. For example, the capital market is intended to
allocate capital to those ventures that are likely to deliver the
best prospects for gain, suitably adjusted by time discounts,
risk factors, etc. Yet this is often not the experience of
companies presenting themselves to the market. As one
investor relations manager from a major pharmaceutical
company explained, “We want to explain our long-term
strategy to fund managers. But since their performance is
assessed on the basis of short-term returns, they will only pay
for information from sell-side analysts relevant to this time
horizon — we find it hard to get through this.” 
Such tensions can often turn to apparent conflicts of interests.
For example, for the market to maintain integrity it is essential
for buy- and sell-side analysts to remain entirely independent;
however the truth can be contradictory. As one roundtable
participant commented, “Buy-side is relying on sell-side to
provide tools to quantify equity risk.” In other words, those
acting on behalf of the owners of capital are taking advice on
how to value companies from those seeking to sell them
corporate stock. 
Such examples are not about “malpractice”, although there
clearly are real dangers and examples of unethical and, at
times, illegal behaviour. Rather, the cases highlight the nature
of the investment value chain as a high density, inter-
connected network. This inter-connectivity in turn generates
diverse and often conflicting signals. Appreciating both
progress in, and impediments to, responsible investment
requires an understanding of the intertwined and
extraordinarily complex characteristics of today’s investment
value chain, even where analysis is confined (as we have) to
publicly traded equities.
Performance Drivers and Impediments
If the roundtables highlighted just one thing, it was the inter-
connectivity of both the impediments and opportunities in
mainstreaming responsible investment. While most roundtable
participants could highlight one or a small number of pieces of
the investment value chain – such as pension fund trustees,
credit agencies, analysts, etc. — there was unanimity that a
broadening of the investment community’s consideration of
social and environmental aspects of corporate performance
would require multiple, diverse reforms at different places in
the investment value chain. Within such diversity, it was
possible to distinguish three sets of impediments that often
cut across the different actors in the chain:
Information: Increased and improved information from 
companies to analysts is needed to underpin investments 
focused on long term business strategy and value creation, 
to enable greater accountability of underlying social and 
environmental risks and opportunities.
Incentives: Changes in incentives along the investment 
value chain, particularly those driving fund manager 
Intertwined Interests in the Investment Value Chain
Rating agencies crucial to establishing benchmarks of likely 
business performance (and so credit worthiness) are paid by 
the very companies they rate, as well as increasingly offering 
advisory services to, amongst others, pension fund trustees.
Buy-side and sell-side analysts are often located within the 
same institution, raising real concerns regarding the fragile 
nature of the internal “Chinese Walls” that are supposed to 
maintain the integrity of advice from each.
Financial advisors to pension fund trustees often 
simultaneously represent asset management companies 
bidding to the same trustees for fund management mandates.
The survival of corporate pension funds depend on the 
fortunes of specific companies that in turn seek investment 
funds from the pension fund industry.
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behaviour, are necessary to shift investment towards a 
longer-term perspective that factors in social and 
environmental performance. 
Competencies: Different and improved competencies along
the investment value chain (for analysts, fund managers, 
trustee advisors and trustees) could increase the account 
taken of longer-term value creation propositions, as well as 
the materiality of social and environmental aspects.
Information
The volume of non-financial information disclosed has certainly
increased, and some standardization in this information has
occurred, for example, through the Global Reporting Initiative
and investor-facing indices like the Dow Jones Sustainability
Index39. The credibility of this information has also increased as
a result of improved sophistication within companies and
improvements in standards of assurance40. As one analyst in a
roundtable commented, “There is an extraordinarily rapid
growth in the volume and quality of information provided by a
new generation of information brokers entering this growing
market with new products and services.”
Despite this, evidence suggests that information available to
mainstream investors is inadequate for the task of linking
social and environmental factors to financial performance41.
Typically, investor surveys suggest that social and
environmental information is increasingly available to them.
However, the incidence of use of such data, beyond providing
one piece of a broad context, remains limited. For example, a
recent survey by Arthur D. Little, produced for Business in the
Community in the UK, highlighted the perception across the
investment community of the inadequacies of non-financial
information42.
The analysis of non-financial information is framed by
investors’ interpretations of the materiality of the disclosures in
corporate reporting. Recent regulatory initiatives, such as the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act45 and the forthcoming changes to UK
Company Law46, reinforce the requirement for companies to
disclose aspects of social and environmental performance
relevant to their future business performance. This is mainly
viewed as a healthy development for those focused on
mainstreaming responsible investment, since it will place
company boards at centre stage in signing-off on which
aspects of non-financial performance are material. It will also
require them to be able to provide sound arguments as to how
these aspects have been determined.
Whether these developments make a real difference depends,
however, on the basis by which materiality is defined.
Definitions of materiality are well established in law and in
professional practice, for example, of the financial audit
community. In broad terms these definitions require that the
reporting organization disclose the information about its
performance required by its shareholders to enable them to
make informed judgements, decisions and actions. But in
truth the interpretation of materiality is a largely pragmatic
affair. Generally this involves a focus on “generally accepted”
financial risks and opportunities as usually defined by
quantitative thresholds, thereby largely servicing the needs of
transactional investors. For example, the high-profile, two-year
case of activist Marc Kasky versus Nike brought the company
before the California and federal supreme courts for allegedly
misrepresenting the state of labour standards in its supplier
factories. Even now, after an out-of-court settlement, the case
raises the spectre of further legal action against Nike and
others, based on similar claims of commercial misstatements.
Yet the case has barely raised an eyebrow from the
mainstream investment community which, it seems, sees such
cases as simply an acceptable overhead cost of doing
business47. Yet a comparable case that involved far higher
settlement costs would certainly figure on investors’ radars
who, once sensitized to the potential risk, might well then
exaggerate the risk, with resulting effects on share prices. 
As one corporate risk manager put it, “Materiality appears a
scientific matter, but actually has more to do with herding:
something becomes material when enough people think it
should be.”
New ways of defining materiality, interpreting it in practice and
subjecting such tests to external assurance are in
development. For example, the five-part materiality test
proposed by AccountAbility, in their submission to the UK
Company Law Review, seeks to expose different
“I have a narrow window of time to absorb a great deal of information.
I will look at these issues (social and environmental factors) when I get
the time…I don’t know when that will be.” 38
“When Nestle had a problem in Ethiopia, they ended up giving back US$
1.5 million — this was important, but clearly not seen as a material issue
to Nestle or its investors.” 43
“We have been in and out of the federal supreme court on this labour
issue. But I cannot think of a single instance of a mainstream investor
asking me about it… they are simply not interested and see this stuff as
part of the ‘cost of doing business’.” 44
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interpretations of materiality in how companies report and
assurance providers assess the quality of such reports48.
Rather than allowing the investment market’s short-term
tendency to, in effect, marginalize issues that would be
material in the longer-term, the proposal explains how
companies could report on performance and impact issues
categorized by different forms of materiality. This would afford
investors and other stakeholders greater visibility into
companies’ understanding of the links between financial and
non-financial performance. Approaches that differentiate forms
of materiality are being increasingly used by a growing number
of businesses producing sustainability or corporate
responsibility reports, particularly as such approaches are
embedded in emerging standards in the field49.
Crucial to raising the underlying quality and materiality of
corporate information are the costs of acquisition, analysis and
delivery to intended users. Even those considered to be
among the world’s best corporate non-financial reports are
often woefully inadequate in addressing the needs of
investors. This has been pointed out repeatedly, for example,
in SustainAbility’s periodic report on the state of sustainability
reporting50. Factoring in non-financial risks and opportunities is
costly, although increased availability of data from analysts
such as the Sustainable Asset Management51 (creator of the
Dow Jones Sustainability Index) and a growing number of
Web-based platforms (for consolidating non-financial data) has
enhanced access to, and reduced cost of investor-friendly
non-financial data. Interpretive costs, however, remain high
and raise major questions concerning the competencies of
today’s analysts, a matter to be discussed below. 
Incentives
Financial incentives are clearly and unsurprisingly a dominant
driver of investor behaviour. Yet there is a serious lack of
information on the workings and impact of incentives within
the investment community. This is despite the fact that within
their investees, the corporate community, “executive pay” has
in recent years become a very high profile and often bitterly
contested issue. Perhaps ironically, this has increasingly
involved active shareholders challenging the rights of their
investees’ managements to such pay deals.
Even more pressing than the issue of pay levels are concerns
regarding the impact of today’s pay structures on investment
decision-making, and often their apparent absence in many
cases of a clear relationship between fund performance and
executive pay. One of many cases exemplifying the cause of
such concerns is the salary of an Aberdeen Asset
Management CEO. His £350,000 salary was topped-up with
an additional “deferred benefit”, which brought his total
remuneration to around £3.2 million, yet the CEO’s overall
responsibility included Aberdeen’s troubled Progressive
Growth Fund. As The Observer newspaper reported,
“Investors in this fund, which invests in zero dividend
preference shares and was marketed as low risk, have lost
half their money in the last year (2003).” 53
As Peter Moon, Chief Investment Officer of the Universities
Superannuation Scheme (USS) states, “It almost goes without
saying that pension funds should invest for the long-term.
Unfortunately, the current system of investment decision-
making has much stronger management mechanisms for
ensuring relative out performance over the short-term.”54 Even
more troubling is that the dynamics of the market for fund
managers themselves appear to drive distorting incentives and
levels of remuneration. One recent report by McKinsey and
Co. found that fund management costs rose by 25% between
2002 and 2003, a trend quite at odds with the performance of
the funds themselves. As the report commented, “This raises
critical questions about how to reward individual performance
without creating excessive dependency on the skills of a few
star fund managers.”55 Additionally, such remuneration
schemes can at times distort investment decisions beyond the
law, as a number of recent high-profile cases involving
investment houses in different parts of the world have
demonstrated.
Unsurprisingly, the roundtables identified current incentives as
a core impediment to mainstreaming responsible investment.
Fund managers pointed to the role of their clients in driving
their focus on short-term performance. As one fund manager
argued, “As long as client [e.g., pension fund trustees]
mandates require us to deliver performance benchmarked
against short-term market tracker indexes, we will of course
remain short-term in our outlook.” Analysts, similarly, argued
that they could rarely advance social and environmental
performance issues so long as their clients, fund managers,
were only concerned with drivers of short-term performance
and market valuations. One analyst summarized his
experience thus, “Strategic research on future social and
environmental risks and opportunities got me my five minutes
of fame. But there were no buyers for the work, and this is
what counts at the end of the day. Given the choice again, if I
want to stay in business, I would not do such research.”
“Not surprisingly then, with the longer-term outlook increasingly
amorphous, the level and recent growth of short-term earnings have
taken on special significance in stock price evaluation, with quarterly
earnings reports subject to anticipation, rumour and ’spin’. Such tactics,
presumably, attempt to induce investors to extrapolate short-term
trends into a favourable long-term view that would raise the current
stock price.”  
Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Federal Reserve System52
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Short-term performance measurement is argued by many in
the investment community as offering the best way to achieve
overall, long-term performance. Yet there are real questions as
to whether this is the case. Researchers from Duke University,
the National Bureau of Economic Research and the University
of Washington have recently published the findings of a survey
on the economic implications of the current corporate financial
reporting practices of more than 400 financial directors. Their
findings support underlying concerns that companies regularly
sacrifice opportunities for value creation, in their efforts to
meet short-term investor expectations. That is, even the
narrow financial interests of the owners of capital are not best
served by the investment community’s focus on short-term
performance. 
Competencies
There is widespread agreement that there exist several major
competency gaps that impede the mainstreaming of
responsible investment, including:
a) Material information. While the need for better non-financial
information that is material to mainstream investors is
accepted, its production is proving difficult. There are many
studies about the “business case for corporate responsibility”,
yet the data generated through these studies is often weak
and not useful to investors undertaking valuations. There are a
growing number of initiatives seeking to better identify the
bridge between financial and non-financial information. These
range from ground-breaking initiatives like the Dow Jones
Sustainability Index, to research-based initiatives such as the
Global Leadership Network involving a group of leading global
companies working with the Boston College of Corporate
Citizenship and AccountAbility (developing scorecards and
benchmark tools to improve the measurement and
management of material aspects of corporate responsibility)58. 
b) Analysts. The ability of mainstream analysts to factor in
social and environmental issues requires them first and
foremost to understand them, including their relationship to
the longer-term strategic thrusts of individual companies and
entire sectors. However most analysts are focused on creating
and selling information to fund managers mainly interested in
free cash flow, major short-term risks and opportunities, and
the likely behaviour of other fund managers. Such
requirements are far more sophisticated and there is little
doubt that many members of today’s generation of analysts
are not currently able to deliver such information. This is partly
a matter of incentives, since the analyst community would
over time reshape and respond if the market demanded a
qualitative shift in information. 
c) Fund Managers. As cited previously, most fund managers
understand far too little about the longer-term thrusts of their
focus sectors. Most would correctly argue that this is because
the market does not demand it or, in short, that the
competency gap is in fact an incentives issue. But the fact
remains that most fund managers, if asked to design an
investment strategy with a long-term time horizon, would not
have the expertise to proceed, lacking knowledge as to what
social and environmental issues might count.
d) Pension Fund Trustees. This represents a very mixed group
with varied competencies. Often those who are most
representative of the interests of intended beneficiaries (union
members, for example), simply do not understand the
complexities of modern-day investment strategies and issues,
and so tend to focus on the more tangible but marginal area of
“project finances” (e.g., inner city property development).
However, as the UK government has made clear,lix it is neither
desirable nor feasible to expect pension scheme trustees to
become experts in investment, nor is it desirable that pension
scheme trustees should be solely investment professionals.
Few understand enough to take a leadership role in driving the
development of fund manager mandates that are compliant
with fiduciary duties, and yet underpinned by a longer-term
and broader perspective of beneficiary interests. 
Competency gaps in addressing social and environmental
dimensions of investment strategies and practices exist all
along the investment value chain. But the roundtables
highlighted the fact that while these competency gaps are in
part about straightforward skill deficits, the underlying problem
concerns a lack of institutional competencies in the form of
appropriate tools and metrics. Further highlighted was a
strong view that the pathway to overcoming both skill and
broader competency gaps lay in the area of incentives. While
the development of competencies may not be simple or
Sacrificing the Long Term
“Because of the severe market reaction to missing an earnings
target, we find that firms are willing to sacrifice economic value in
order to meet a short-run earnings target….The preference for
smooth earnings is so strong that 78% of the surveyed
executives would give up economic value in exchange for
smooth earnings…. We find that 55% of managers would avoid
initiating a very positive NPV project if it meant falling short of the
current quarter’s consensus earnings.”
Source: John Graham et. al., “The Economic Implications of
Corporate Financial Reporting”57
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achieved overnight, it could only occur if the market rewarded
different knowledge, skills and their application.
Reshaping the Investment Value Chain
Today’s investment value chain comprises many players with
diverse interests and approaches. This includes some with a
longer-term and at times broader perspective on the manner
and purpose of investment. The bulk of the chain, however,
retains an essentially short-term, narrow perspective. This
perspective is either unresponsive to most social and
environmental issues, or actively seeks to invest in companies
that are effective in externalizing themselves from their
responsibility as a means of enhancing shareholder value. That
is, the investment value chain is mainly neutral and, at times,
decidedly counter-productive regarding the social and
environmental consequences of their investees’ actions.
That the investment value chain as a whole does not factor in
social and environmental issues is not most usefully
understood in terms of the personal values of its participants.
This situation arises because of today’s blend of available
information, participant competencies and, most of all, the
institutionalized incentives that drive their behaviour. These
factors combine to create the perception that significant
competitive disadvantage will befall any one player that strays
from customary practice. In other words, the development of
responsible investment is impeded by a fear that taking the
first step alone toward change also involves the most risk,
even though all players together would benefit from such
changes. The challenge is clearly to identify appropriate
measures that will both overcome specific impediments and
trigger the systemic change that reshapes the investment
value chain, particularly in ways that reward rather than
penalize more progressive investors.
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market makers and third-party research vendors). Assuming
that information is ubiquitous, it is nevertheless a useful
(though approximate) construct to imagine the string as the
primary pipeline for information exchange and formal
interaction among the various participants. 
The role of investment consultants in the clients’ decision-
making processes cannot be overemphasized. Consultants
provide a wide range of services to clients, notably: advice on
benefits policies, asset allocation analysis, selection of
benchmarks, due diligence on fund managers, and
recommendations on manager selection, evaluation, and
termination. Although plan sponsors retain responsibility as
primary (named) fiduciaries, consultants provide much of the
analysis and tools by which investment committees and
trustees make decisions. As a result, the lens through which
consultants and plan sponsors view the fund management
industry — composed of the metrics and language by which
they evaluate fund managers — is a critical determinant of
behaviour in the long-term. Their perspectives on the relative
attractiveness of various asset classes, their selection of
benchmark indices used to measure fund managers’
performance, their assessment of active managers’ ability to
outperform passively-managed alternatives, and their
investment time horizons have profound impact on fund flows
into and within the industry. Consultants are key participants in
the value creation chain and, in the context of responsible
investing, will likely be important agents for influencing change.
The sell-side fulfils a somewhat analogous role with publicly
traded companies, through: advice (in the form of investment
banking relationships); trading desks (which make markets in
their stock): and research departments (that “report” on
company news). Notwithstanding the negative press they have
received, sell-side research departments fill an important
information gap in the fund management industry, providing an
efficient means for companies to disseminate information to
the marketplace. In particular, following Regulation Full
Disclosure (Reg. FD) in the United States, which requires
corporations to treat all investors equitably in the
dissemination of material information, the sell-side has taken
on an even more substantial role in coordinating access to
companies’ management teams through conferences and
presentations. Given their role as “reporters” of financial
information — despite the caveat that there is no implicit or
explicit guarantee of objectivity in their content — the sell-side
is likely to remain an important participant in the industry as it
evolves. 
Mehdi Mahmud, Executive Vice-President, 
Jennison Associates
Overview
Investment management is one of the most highly regulated
industries in the world. Critics argue that this has led to a
gradual diminution in creative, long-term oriented (and
potentially more rewarding) approaches to investing. On the
other hand, proponents point to recurring instances of the
industry’s failure to police itself as the driver of increased
regulatory scrutiny. Regardless of which camp one might
sympathize with, the net effect is that the investment
management business, in the United States and the United
Kingdom in particular, has evolved into a carefully calibrated
system of checks and balances designed to value “investment
process” and “control” as much as “superior returns” and
“risk.” Stated differently, the net impact of these checks and
balances is that significantly more emphasis is now placed on
producing proof statements of control and measurement at
each stage of the investment process than ever before. This
occurred in conjunction with developments in the vernacular of
portfolio and performance analysis, which has rapidly become
the standard for investment communication among
constituents in the fund management industry. Key
participants in this equation, on a daily basis, include
beneficiaries, trustees and their investment committees,
financial advisors and consultants, fund managers, third party
research providers (commonly sell–side firms), and of course,
the universe of publicly traded companies in which fund
managers may invest. Regulators play an omnipresent, though
more strategic, role in directing the method and content of
interaction among participants. This image — of an industry
that has developed around an elaborate system of checks and
balances — is critical to keep in perspective during any
serious examination of the methods by which the industry’s
practices might evolve over time.
From the point of view of the investment manager, perhaps the
simplest visualization of how the key participants interact with
each other is to imagine five rings, arranged in a horizontal
line, connected by a string. The leftmost ring represents the
client, including beneficiaries, trustees and their investment
committees. The centre ring represents the fund manager, and
the rightmost ring represents the universe of companies in
which the fund manager may invest. The ring that separates
the client from the fund manager is the investment consultant
to the client, while the ring that separates the universe of
publicly traded companies from the fund manager is the sell-
side analyst (broadly defined to include investment bankers,
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Where We Are
Among other things, the roundtables made clear that
“responsible investing” remains a niche in the fund
management industry today (within strict parameters of the
definition of “responsible investing” in this paper, for certainly
no asset manager would claim to do the opposite). Admittedly,
there are pockets of activity focusing on specific themes (such
as the Calvert Group in the US), or approaches (such as
Hermes Investment Management in the UK). However, for
mainstream asset managers, the most common and explicit
form of responsible investing involves pre-investment non-
financial screening of the universe of opportunities, in
compliance with precise guidelines from clients. In addition,
active managers typically will also consider the impact of
companies’ business models, and their managements’
approach and track record, regarding social and
environmental issues, so long as the analysis is material to
their financial performance within the foreseeable future. The
extent to which this type of analysis is performed varies
tremendously from one asset management company to
another, driven by differences in philosophy, investment time
horizon, propensity to take risk, degree of benchmark
orientation and depth of skilled resources. Stated differently,
fund managers’ interest in and motivation to consider
responsible investment criteria — except to fulfil clients’
explicit directions (in which case pre-investment screens are
used) — stems from their competitive desire to outperform
relevant benchmarks and peers, towards which end they will
typically bring to bear all relevant information and analysis, so
long as it is material to performance and likely to be
recognized in the marketplace within a time period consistent
with their clients’ investment horizons. Despite the competitive
urge to outperform using all possible means to generate an
investment “edge”, the use of responsible investment criteria
in day-to-day research and portfolio decision-making remains
an exception rather than the rule, driven to a large degree by
the inertia of practices and standards that have come to
dominate the industry over time. 
Regulatory Environment
The objective of responsible investment is complicated by the
reality that we live in a world with little disclosure about the
long-term impact of corporations’ social and environmental
policies on their businesses. This lack of disclosure is further
compounded by the lack of industry standards by which such
long-term liabilities of uncertain magnitude can be
incorporated into traditional approaches to financial analysis.
Consequently, the link between companies’ long-term social
and environmental practices and their short-, intermediate- or
even long-term financial performance generally tends to be
unclear, with the exception of current activity (such as
litigation) that falls within extant definitions of “materiality”.
On the other hand, it is no surprise that the fund management
industry has grown up with explicit rules governing every
aspect of their activity, given the highly regulated nature of the
business. As a result, the parameters within which a fund
manager can invest clients’ assets are strictly defined, and
those definitions tend to be interpreted in the narrowest
construct of financial returns and risks consistent with clients’
investment time horizons. Fund managers need to act in
demonstrable compliance with the performance objective of
optimizing clients’ financial returns, which is typically defined in
their contracts relative to certain benchmark indices, at
specific levels of risk, and/or with respect to pre-defined peer
groups. The need for demonstrable compliance creates a
burden of proof on the part of the fund manager, which at best
heightens managers’ sensitivity towards risk-taking and at
worst encourages inertia around “tried and true” approaches
that are easily defensible. This high level of regulatory
awareness and scrutiny, combined with the widespread use of
benchmark indices and clients’ gradually shortening time
horizons for performance evaluation, is a powerful driver of
conservatism among fund managers with respect to
innovation. Therefore, in the absence of some combination of
greater disclosure on the part of corporations regarding the
long-term business impact of their social and environmental
policies and wide acceptance of metrics by which such long-
term liabilities are valued, the industry standard of
demonstrable compliance is likely to remain a significant
hurdle to mainstreaming responsible investment. 
Fund Manager Evaluation
The science of performance measurement has undergone
revolutionary change. The introduction of Harry Markowitz’s
Capital Asset Pricing Model60 (CAPM) helped establish the
concept of a “market portfolio”. Over time, the combination of
insights from CAPM, further refinements thereof and, in
particular, the often misused work on asset allocation by
Brinson et al.,61 catalysed the propagation and in some cases
creation of a myriad of benchmark indices covering almost
every asset class, geography, market capitalization and style.
The language of asset allocation quickly became the standard
for discourse in the industry, leading to rapid, widespread and
systematic implementation of index-oriented performance
measurement for fund managers. Today, these indices are
ubiquitous, so much so that what began as a means of more
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aggressively managing their line-up of products to meet
evolving demands in the marketplace. As business planning
and compensation practices go hand-in-hand, it is not
surprising that compensation practices in the industry have
evolved towards shorter-term performance. If left unchecked,
this is likely to further encourage clustering of fund managers’
performance around narrowly defined benchmarks, and to
discourage adoption of broader, longer-term perspectives in
fund managers’ investment decisions. The good news,
however, is that there are many notable firms in the industry
that are exceptions to this trend, and to the extent they are
able to continue building investment cultures focused around
and compensated according to superior long-term
performance, they could form the nucleus of a counter-trend
in compensation practices. In the US, increasing demands
from regulators for greater disclosure regarding fund
managers’ compensation structures could well be a tailwind to
this counter-trend — if not taken to the extreme. To the extent
this idea catches on globally, it would provide clients and
consultants better visibility into the environment and culture of
investment management organizations and could be a
powerful catalyst for re-focusing the industry on longer-term
investment performance. 
As the primary conduit by which publicly traded corporations
access capital markets, the increasing focus of financial
market participants on short-term performance is reflected in
and abetted by sell-side behaviour. A wonderfully revealing
(though limited) example of extreme myopia can be found in
analysts’ earnings forecasts. For examplel62, as of 31 August
1989, there were 14 publicly available earnings forecasts for
each of the first and second fiscal years of the Intel
Corporation (Intel); however, there were only four publicly
available forecasts of earnings three years forward. As of 31
August 2004, there were 37 publicly available earnings
forecasts for each of the first and second fiscal years of Intel, a
clear indication that the industry (and the company) has grown
significantly over the last 15 years. Most notable, however, is
that there were only two publicly available earnings forecasts
of earnings three years forward (yet this is one of the most
widely analysed companies on the planet). While this example
is intended to be illustrative and not prescriptive, it very lucidly
encapsulates the short-term orientation of the sell-side analyst
as an aggregator and disseminator of information. As a
consequence, it is no surprise that the sell-side analyst’s
short-term orientation not only spills over into the financial
press and general media, but also reflexively influences the
perspectives of clients, investment consultants, and ultimately
investment professionals at fund management companies, as
well. With that as backdrop, it is clear that any serious attempt
to promote responsible investment will entail fundamental
rigorously measuring fund managers’ performance has
gradually become a constraint on fund managers’ discretion.
While there are exceptions, the empirical evidence is that the
average manager’s propensity to assume risk relative to their
respective benchmarks (a statistical measure called tracking
error) has declined over time, leading to greater clustering of
fund managers’ returns. This tendency towards herding is
another hurdle to mainstreaming responsible investment, as it
reduces managers’ willingness to try new approaches. The
good news is that many investment consultants and fund
managers have recognized this problem and are at the leading
edge of reform in the industry with respect to the specification
and usage of benchmarks for performance evaluation. It is still
unclear as to whether this counter-trend is sustainable, but
initial evidence in the US is encouraging, driven by clients’
renewed demand for differentiated, less correlated (with each
other) investment performance from their fund managers. To
the extent the counter-trend persists, the “benchmarking”
hurdle to incorporating responsible investment into
mainstream fund management will diminish over time. 
Correlated to the problem of benchmarking, two other
elements of performance evaluation have negatively impacted
fund managers’ inclination to evolve their investment
approaches to incorporate new and/or different perspectives,
including that of responsible investing. These are: (1) the
industry’s overwhelming focus on the “investment process,”
often superseding results, and (2) the rapidly shrinking time
horizon over which investment performance is measured.
Perceived theoretical rigour and stability of fund managers’
investment processes are often key components of fund
managers’ scorecards among third-party performance
evaluators, and are therefore drivers of business success. It is
no surprise then that fund managers are reluctant to employ
research or portfolio management approaches that could,
under scrutiny, appear revolutionary or less than “air-tight.”
Similarly, short time horizons for performance evaluation
provide incentive for managers to try “what will produce results
today” rather than take risks that are intended to pay off over a
longer time horizon. These hurdles are the result of
shortcomings in existing standards for fund manager
evaluation, which nevertheless have become pervasive and
are unlikely to be reversed overnight. 
Compensation
As the time horizon for evaluating performance has gradually
shortened, investment management companies have evolved
their business models accordingly. The time horizon for
business planning has shrunk, with many companies
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alterations to behaviour in “reporting” upon the nature of long-
term social and environmental policies of the companies they
analyse, and their potential impact to future financial returns.
There is no doubt this will require greater disclosure on the
part of corporations, most likely catalysed by regulatory
scrutiny if not intervention; in addition, it will require closer
inspection and possible re-organization of business models
and incentive structures of research providers. 
Investment Experience
Another practical impediment to mainstreaming responsible
investment has to do with the level of experience and depth of
talent within fund management organizations. With the
exception of firms organized around intensive proprietary
research efforts and performance oriented cultures, the vast
majority of fund management companies tend to recruit
relatively inexperienced professionals as research analysts.
Analysts in such positions typically rely heavily on sell-side
information and analysis during their first few years of
employment, which of course further bolsters the extent to
which short-term information drives investment
recommendations and decision-making at the average fund
management complex. Furthermore, the typical career path in
such organizations is that successful research analysts are
promoted to become fund managers, and successful fund
managers are promoted to become business leaders. The
result is that research analysts who have spent years honing
their analytical skills and industry knowledge — and are
therefore at peak levels of preparedness to perform truly
differentiating investment research on companies’ long-term
business models — are removed from specialist roles and
placed into more generalist fund management positions,
where there is less scope to apply those skills and knowledge.
Similarly, successful fund managers are typically laden with
increasing responsibility for business and administrative
functions over time, which impairs their ability to manage
portfolios in meaningfully differentiated ways. Stated differently,
this situation compels them to rely on less seasoned
investment professionals for buy and sell recommendations on
securities in their portfolios. On the other hand, given the
uncertain nature and magnitude of the impact from
companies’ long-term social and environmental policies (on
their business models and eventual financial performance), it is
clear that only investment professionals with sufficient length
of experience and depth of industry knowledge would be
capable of effectively assimilating this information into concrete
investment conclusions that could be expected to outperform
consensus points of view. This divergence between career
paths at typical fund management companies and the
investment skill-set that is a pre-requisite for successful long-
term investing is an impediment to mainstreaming responsible
investment. 
The Path Ahead
It was clear from the roundtables that the intellectual
underpinnings of responsible investment appeal to both fund
managers and their clients. The theory goes that fund
managers would benefit from clearer understanding of
companies’ long-term policies and prospects by making
better investment decisions, while clients would reap the
rewards through higher returns on their capital over the long-
term. Given the fundamental alignment of interests, therefore,
the path ahead must begin with basic fiduciary principles:
what is in the clients’ best interests should drive evolution in
the fund management industry, with public policy support
when needed. 
A few of these evolutionary processes are already underway.
The combination of slowing economic activity and reduced
expectations of financial asset performance has forced market
participants to re-think their investment policies. Widely held
pre-conceptions about asset allocation policy and use of
benchmarks are being questioned, with much creative thought
directed toward alternative methods of meeting clients’ needs
through portfolio engineering. The current heady pace of
change in this area, if sustained, is likely to lead the fund
management industry in a new direction over the next few
years (just as asset allocation research ushered in a new wave
in the mid-80s), one that appears at this juncture to encourage
managers away from “herding” around their benchmarks. It is
too early to tell how this type of shift in the industry’s attitudes
towards investing will impact investors’ time horizons, though
it is logical and indeed probable that their time horizons will at
least stop shrinking. Frankly, many fund managers will resist
this type of change. However, the good news is that the
industry at its core is a performance-driven culture, which is
likely to embrace the shift away from “benchmarking.” 
An area where some progress is being made, albeit
episodically, is in the extent of due diligence that is performed
on fund managers outside of investment performance
analysis. This includes the thorough review and assessment of
whether or not a fund management company’s depth of
resources, level of investment experience and organizational
structure is conducive to creating and sustaining a culture that
can reasonably be expected to generate superior investment
performance for clients over the long term. While regulatory
pressure for greater disclosure on compensation practices is
likely to help — assuming those pressures are not extended to
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Overview
Acceptance by sell-side equity analysts of the need for
responsible investment is low. In the words of one company
investor relations director, “… they just don’t get it.” This paper
intends to shed some light on this lack of engagement and
offers some ideas on the steps that might be required if this is
to change. Its broad conclusions are:
Mainstream sell-side equity research is comprised of a 
fragmented community of analysts whose priorities are 
formed through their interaction with companies and 
particularly with clients.
Sell-side equity analysts currently focus most on social and 
environmental issues when identifying and quantifying risks 
expected to emerge in the very near term. 
burdensome extremes — it will require a seismic shift in
clients’ preferences towards lengthier relationships with their
fund managers, in order to steer the industry in the direction of
more thorough due diligence of investment cultures. While
much information along these lines is collected in the typical
Request For Proposal (RFP) process during fund manager
searches, most decisions in the industry continue to be made
primarily on the basis of historical performance analysis. In the
absence of identifiable catalysts, it is unclear how and when
such an evolution of buyer preferences might unfold. 
Finally, the area where least progress is being made (and likely
to remain that way without some level of public policy
intervention or guidance) relates to corporations’ willingness to
disclose information about their social and environmental
practices, and to estimate the impact of those practices on
their long-term business performance. This is perhaps the
most significant hurdle to mainstreaming responsible
investment, and will likely require an extensive, multi-
disciplinary investigation in order to fully understand the
underlying issues. In the public policy arena, decisions will
need to be made about the feasibility of legislative solutions to
compel corporations to identify and disclose issues that are
inherently complex. Indeed, whether or not such legislation
could even be enforced is an open question, given the long
time horizons over which companies’ social and environmental
policies may produce measurable impact. Assuming those
hurdles are surmountable, accounting and valuation standards
will also need to be established for such disclosures to be
effectively incorporated into mainstream fund managers’ day-
to-day investment decisions. 
Three major impediments to a more mainstream adoption 
of responsible investing are that: (1) the current data set of 
performance indicators does not yet add up to a consistent
whole; (2) there is limited ability among the current 
population of investment analysts with respect to analysing 
social and environmental investment criteria; and (3) the 
way sell-side equity analysts are paid represents a 
significant disincentive to challenging this situation.
Key drivers promoting change include steadily improving 
information, the current review of the research business 
models and the inherent flexibility of the sell-side equity 
analysts community to change. However, the initiating 
factor will only come from a greater demand to use 
responsible investment criteria from the buy-side client 
base. Regulators may contribute with measures that 
promote the publication of good quality data, enhance the 
competency of analysts and lead to a review of how 
incentives are paid.  
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What position does sell-side equity analysis occupy in the
Investment Value Chain?
Sell-side equity analysis occupies a very specific position in
the investment value chain. Its goal is to uncover investment
opportunities from among the various equity instruments
quoted on a recognized exchange. The critical factor that
defines the sell-side is that these ideas, and the rest of the
research service, are provided to investment professionals in a
broad range of client firms.
Investment banks and stockbroking firms employ the vast
majority of the population of sell-side equity analysts either as
individuals or as part of sector teams.
The purpose of investment banks/stockbrokers employing
these analysts is to capture a greater share of trading
commission in secondary equity market. There is therefore a
close connection between the revenues of an equities
business, the perceived value of the research service provided
and the remuneration of the individual analyst or team. Side
benefits of employing analysts, such as in providing
information to trading desks and supporting corporate finance
activities, have been subject to greater regulation in the last
four years, which has further focused the priorities of analysts
on generating secondary commission revenue.
“Mainstream” (or occasionally “large-cap”) analysis
distinguishes those analysts that focus on the large and mid-
sized listed companies in North America, Europe and, within
limits, Asia. Among these regions the size cut-off is far from
clearly marked, but currently appears to be near an equity
market capitalization of approximately €2.5 billion. Mainstream
sell-side equity analysis therefore represents a distinct and, in
market capitalization terms, most significant segment of
research provision compared to small-cap, emerging market
or socially-responsible investment (SRI) research.
In Europe there are over 1,000 sell-side equity analysts,
however use of the term “sell-side analytical community” when
making points about this group is simply a matter of
convenience. In practice, the population of sell-side equity
analysts is fragmented by sector, different competitive
advantage of some research franchises and different strengths
of individual client networks and company/industry
knowledge. Short careers (spanning from about the ages of
25 to 45) and high staff turnover (especially when revenue falls)
mean that the individuals that make up the population of
analysts has changed markedly over the years. With so little
social cohesion it is understandable that there have been few
examples of co-ordination within this “community”.
For sell-side equity analysts, the two main drivers are their
relationships with the companies they follow and the clients
they service. Success on both fronts underpins the standing of
any individuals and teams, in internal/external surveys and
among the investment banks.
Companies. Most sell-side equity analysts value their
independence. Even so, quoted companies have a number of
reasons for seeking their help in maximizing their share price.
Such reasons include increasing the value of shares used for
making acquisitions, minimizing the diluting impact of raising
capital, as a defence against hostile takeovers, and optimizing
the value of management incentives such as stock options. In
doing so, companies seek to provide sell-side equity analysts
with information and, on occasion, to court their influence.
Regular statutory results announcements provide the basic
financial information that analysts need to operate. At such
times company investor relations teams may seek to manage
the control of any commentary in order to accentuate the
positives. In maintaining their independence, sell-side equity
analysts need to weigh the extent to which they can challenge
the signals being given out by any company, while maintaining
the best possible working relationship with them.
Knowledge of companies and access to both additional
information and to management teams is a key differentiating
factor between sell-side research teams. In maintaining the
dialogue with companies, sell-side equity analysts can
enhance their position with market feedback and by the
facilitation of contact between company management and
their (current or future) shareholders. Most companies
welcome this, as it helps them in their quest to increase their
share price. An important element in the way that companies
view a sell-side equity analyst therefore involves the
recognition and respect that that analyst gets from their
clients. 
Clients. As the paying customer for the research service,
clients are the key driver of the behaviour of sell-side equity
analysts. Underlying this is the investment approach adopted
by most institutions: that a sequence of short-term investment
decisions is the best way to generate the required long-term
returns of investors.
What is it that clients require of the sell-side? In practice, it is a
combination of good quality investment ideas and dependability
of contact that contributes to the rating of sell-side analysts.
The Institutional Investor’s Survey Report (March 2004 pointed
out that the buy-side rated analysts most highly on industry
knowledge, trustworthiness, accessibility/responsiveness,
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access to company management, and useful/timely calls and
visits. Similarly, Thomson Extel’s 2004 survey points out that
“direct analyst contact, well constructed investment ideas and
crisp, pointed thematic research are at the heart of a
successful sell-side relationship”.
Sell-side analysts are, however, finding that they are required
to cover more clients. Two years ago the call-list of a
mainstream sell-side equity analyst in Europe was dominated
by up to 70 long-only funds with different investment styles
and approaches and their own analyst teams. This has
changed dramatically as hedge funds have emerged as key
players in the equity market. Some observers estimate that
there are now 500 hedge funds in London alone running US$
120 billion in assets, and their importance is even greater
since their dealing activity means that they account 25-50% of
secondary equity commission.
At the same time, there is greater competition for the attention
of clients because most large companies on both sides of the
Atlantic are now being covered by an average of about 20
analysts. This rivalry is intensifying as firms cut their lists of
approved brokers.
A last trend worth noting is the declining emphasis placed on
written research. In the Institutional Investor’s Survey Report,
written research was rated only 8th in a list of the most
important variables shaping the sell-side’s perceptions of
research, trailing behind more service-oriented factors.
How do sell-side analysts currently approach social and
environmental issues?
Mainstream sell-side equity analysts employ a number of
financial modelling, corporate strategy and industry analysis
techniques, in order to place the current competitive position
of companies and to project their likely future. These help in
determining the likelihood of events that will have a significant
impact on share price, such as acquisitions and disposals,
competition issues, the possibility of bid activity and the need
for raising capital. Within this framework, all serious sell-side
analysts gain an understanding that non-financial issues affect
the value of an equity, even though these might be lumped
together under “political risk”.
Sell-side equity analysis mostly tends to engage with these
issues when they first emerge as risk factors and then become
key share price drivers. Litigation in the asbestos and tobacco
industries would represent two examples of this shift.
One example of this focus on risk emergence, but not on an
underlying analysis of environmental and social risk, comes in
the mining sector. Mining companies have long confronted
situations which expose them to potential social and
environmental issues. While discussion still continues on the
legacy of earlier mining activity it is fair to say that most mining
companies do now recognize a requirement to balance the
generation of returns for shareholders with the needs of other
stakeholders. The largest companies have led the way with
the launch of the Global Mining Initiative in 2000 and the
subsequent publication of the Mining and Minerals Sustainable
Development report in 2002, “Breaking New Ground”. This
has helped to embed a greater level of responsibility in a large
part of the industry. In the period since, all of the major
London-listed mining companies and the North American
aluminium companies have begun to more strongly
communicate their record, through the annual publication of
environmental and social reports.
The mining industry continues to be confronted by a number
of issues. HIV/AIDS prevalence has risen among workforces,
especially in southern Africa. Legislative change in South
Africa has required the explicit recognition of historically
disadvantaged citizens. Monitoring of both environmental and
social performance has increased. At the same time, the
adoption of the Equator Principles by commercial banks has
put non-financial performance centre stage in project
financing, and the Extractive Industries Review has further
developed the debate on the priorities of the World Bank.
Through all of this, mining equity analysts have continued to
focus largely on the sensitivity of mining company earnings
and valuation to prevailing commodity prices and exchange
rates. Despite the (often extreme) volatility of these short-term
factors, changes are at least easily identified on screens.
Analysts also seem more comfortable forecasting their future
direction than they are in identifying and quantifying changes in
non-financial risk.
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ABN AMRO’s Climate Change
ABN AMRO published “Climate Change and Analysis” in November
2003, a 32-page outline of an analytical framework. The report was
initiated by a head of research who identified a cross-sectoral theme
and saw an opportunity to involve a number of sectors across his
research team. The aims of the note were twofold: “As well as
hopefully providing useful information to our investor clients, the
purpose of this note is partly to encourage our company analysts to
include these issues in their thinking.” In order to enhance the external
profile of the note, its publication was timed to coincide with the
Institutional Investor Group on Climate Change (IIGCC) a couple of
weeks later.
The lead author was helped by a number of factors that few individual
sell-side equity analysts are able to draw upon. Having previously
been an equity strategist he already had experience in writing across a
broad canvas. As Head of Global Research he was able to call for
collaboration by research teams across a range of sectors. His
managerial position also provided the authority to justify an exercise
that, in time alone, represented an investment.
The report received various reactions. Among the external audience, it
was welcomed by fund management companies with a longer-term
viewpoint and achieved its goal of wide circulation around the IIGCC
conference. However there is little evidence that it attracted much
attention from investment managers outside of this group. Internally, it
succeeded in focusing analysts on the issue with follow-up in a small
number of sectors, but failed to gain significant traction as a
“marketable” product among the equity sales force.
The range of critical comment could be categorised as follows:
Positives
It dealt with a topical and material issue and supported ABN AMRO’s
involvement in the IIGCC conference in November 2003.
It was a good effort in a cross-sectoral approach to a major 
global issue.
It was comprehensive, in that it included most of the industries likely
to be affected by climate change issues (such as metals and mining,
utilities, automotive, aviation, insurance).
It helped to create a contextual background against which ABN
AMRO’s clients could judge the need to adjust to climate change
pressures for individual sectors and companies.
Negatives
Sales teams could not identify the key selling points of the research.
It lacked specific equity recommendations and was therefore of itself
not “actionable” and not “commercial”.
It failed to adequately quantify any of the issues.
It was perceived to have been a burden in terms of drawing senior
analysts away from their immediate profit and loss responsibilities.
The note demonstrated to ABN AMRO’s analysts that it is possible to
write a broad, cross-sectoral piece of research, outlining a global
environmental issue and creating a context in which to make
decisions regarding investment at both a sector and company level.
Where it succeeded was in condensing a very broad issue and
highlighting the key questions for shareholders. The feedback
suggests that where it fell short was in failing to, first, provide answers
in a way that was relevant to the majority of  clients (and the sales
people who talk to them) and, second, to deliver investment
recommendations.
What is apparent from the reaction to the note is that innovative
research such as this requires both a very strong grasp of the issues
(allowing a very structured argument of the likely outcomes) and the
ability to focus on the most likely scenario. It needs to be founded on
sufficient information or estimation to identify causes, their most likely
effects and (critically) the probable impact on sectors and on
individual equities.
Mining analysts who have achieved sporadic success in identifying and quantifying emerging risks have been reacting to specific
events. An example would be the original leaking of South Africa’s draft mining charter, which was a distinct catalyst for
movement in share prices. With knowledge of mining company exposure and informed guesswork on the likely impact of black
economic empowerment legislation,  sell-side equity analysts were able to write research quantifying the likely effects and
indicating appropriate share price levels.
Few, however, have been successful in to trying to outline the mining industries’ longer-term trends or the appropriateness of
company business models. As yet no-one appears to have interpreted recent events as an indicator of future returns.
Yet it would be unfair to pick on mining analysts, when in truth the broad philosophy of responsible investment has made little
headway among most mainstream equity analysts. This reluctance to move the research time horizon beyond the foreseeable
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and the quantifiable represents a concern that such analysis
falls short of being “commercial”. The previous box details
some examples of reactions that can greet research deemed
to be too far out regarding time horizon and breadth of theme.
It suggests that closing the gap between identifying the key
themes in a global investment idea (like climate change) and
generating specific investment ideas needs two, more
important, further steps: (1) there must be sufficient
information or analysis to differentiate between the implications
for individual industries, and (2) the results of the analysis must
be sufficiently quantified and focused to underpin specific
investment recommendations.
What impediments are there to a deeper involvement of sell-
side equity analysts in responsible investment?
The obstructions follow the broad themes of the availability of
information, the relevant competencies to analyse it and the
incentives/disincentives to pursuing this further engagement.
A. Information
Sell-side equity analysts have a number of tried and tested
sources of information on which they can build their financial
models and which can serve as pointers to changing trends in
company performance. The same is not true for non-financial
information; constructing a similar data set represents a major
hurdle to the embedding of responsible investment.
There is little doubt that the efforts of multilateral institutions,
NGOs, consultancies, industry groups and companies have
substantially increased the amount of information available to
provide a framework for responsible investment. The World
Bank and the UN have published large scale research on the
main issues. The principal NGOs have all undertaken their own
research and have websites and mailing systems that convey
their key messages. The work of various bodies (such as the
Carbon Disclosure Project, WRI and Innovest) has created the
foundations for many cross-sectoral analyses. Industry groups
(such as in the mining industry, and soon, the cement industry)
are helping to identify the main issues and working to establish
best practice. Almost all of the larger companies covered by
sell-side equity analysts publish social and environmental
information (see www.CorporateRegister.com). All of this work
is steadily creating a background for making judgements on
non-financial performance.
Yet the progress that has been made remains fragmented,
with little consistency in approach and considerable gaps in
the data set: 
Data collection is patchy and difficult to analyse. Gaps still 
remain in terms of coverage. Only 59% of FT500 firms 
responded to the second request by the Carbon Disclosure
Project, published earlier this year. Sustainable Asset 
Management sees just 20% of its questionnaires returned. 
Even the proposed London Stock Exchange survey, helpful 
though it may be, will only provide information on the UK 
subset of companies in the pan-European equity universe. 
At a sector level, there is still too little structure in the 
individual weightings given to management quality/risk 
factors. What, for instance, is the appropriate way to weigh 
safety records relative to employee diversity?
Equity analysts in Europe largely view NGOs with suspicion.
In the US they view them as hostile and patronizing to the 
financial community, driven by a narrow ideological agenda,
unregulated and too often irresponsible with its information.
Against this background, the social and environmental 
lobby groups still have a long way to go in providing 
rigorous and authoritative information that could be used by
sell-side equity analysts.
Company data on social and environmental performance is 
rarely audited and lacks any historic benchmarks. There are
a number of problems. First, the absence of significant 
verification or authority of the data gives it a quality that is 
little better than anecdotal. Companies have proved adept 
at twisting accounting data, so why not social and 
environmental figures? Second, the data is published 
annually and usually too late to significantly update a view 
on an equity. Third, individual company reports are proving 
to be of limited use in stock selection, given the absence of
agreement on key indicators and a wide variation in social 
and environmental reporting standards. Finally, for some 
companies, reporting has only recently begun, therefore is 
no track record to compare recent trends against.
Considerable progress is being made in establishing indicators
of performance for environmental, social and ethical
performance. Gaps remain, however, and the data set does
not yet add up to a coherent whole. Sell-side equity analysts
are, unfortunately, unlikely to fill much of this void. Prevailing
pressure on time and resources means that, despite increased
computer power on the desk, the processing capacity of sell-
side equity research teams remains limited. 
B. Competency
Clearly, the ability of mainstream analysts to factor in social
and environmental issues requires them to, first and foremost,
understand them.
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In the last two decades, the development of equity analysis
has focused largely on developing financial expertise,
anticipating corporate events and establishing valuation
benchmarks. Competency revolves around the interpretation
of accounts, the analysis of structural position and the
development of discounted cash flow valuation models.
Analysis of non-financial criteria has mostly focused on “quality
of management”, particularly following the corporate abuses of
recent years. Commitment to this looks thin, however, as it
features on the official reading list of the Chartered Financial
Analyst (CFA) programme yet has failed to gain sufficient
importance to become an issue in the examination process.
Focus on other non-financial aspects is even leaner; for
example, the London component of the CFA’s continuing
development programme provides just 1.5 hours of training in
social and environmental issues during its entire 12 month
duration.
Probably the single biggest step in pushing sell-side equity
analysts into their first tentative steps toward responsible
investment has been the emergence of Socially Responsible
Investment (SRI) funds among the client base. This contact
between questioning clients and mainstream equity analysts
has helped to raise awareness of the impact of environmental,
social and ethical risk. There are a number of sectors (such as
mining, tobacco, food producers, oil and gas) where the ability
to spot the surfacing of such risks might provide an
opportunity for differential performance.
The main reason most advances toward responsible investing
by sell-side equity analysts have followed the surfacing of risks
is that most analysts (and their contacts) already operate in
this manner. And under this model, one of the few ways that
sell-side equity analysts can offer added value is by
anticipating the emergence of a new risk in the short term.
However, if responsible investment is to take a greater hold
among mainstream sell-side equity analysts, it will require a
different way of thinking and different approaches to analysis,
either by introducing a different set of competencies or a
different set of analysts. 
Knowledge on social and environmental factors exists in 
the sell-side analytical community but it is still thinly spread 
and tenuous. Given the short lifespan of equity analysts this
means that many only become oriented to social and 
environmental issues towards the end of their investment 
banking careers.
Expanding existing practice for analysing equities to include
non-financial criteria demands a significant investment in 
training. Mature sell-side equity analysts learn most “in situ”
by research writing. However they only aim to write 
research that will be immediately consumed and acted 
upon by their buy-side clients. For the current stock of sell-
side equity analysts to gain sufficient knowledge to judge 
companies on responsible investing criteria, it would require
a significant investment in training or in writing research that
could be too easily categorized (at least internally) as “non-
commercial”.
New analysts are receiving too little training in the use of 
non-financial criteria in equity valuation. As a result, an 
impediment still exists on the extent to which the turnover 
in the population of sell-side equity analysts might promote 
a change in investment philosophy.
The prevailing culture in sell-side equity analysis remains 
focused on financial criteria. Most sell-side analysts remain 
focused on winning in the current system rather than 
attempting to change it. Few managers in investment 
banking firms, who developed in the trading floor 
environment, buy-in to the notion of responsible investing.
For sell-side equity analysts to deliver a different type of
research product focusing on non-financial criteria requires a
change in culture and a refocusing of management approach,
beyond the “measurables” of call rates and short-term market
share. As we will see in the next section, there are
considerable short- term disincentives to making these
changes.
C. Incentives
The previous two sections have indicated that for sell-side
equity analysts to make the shift from financial investment
criteria to responsible investment criteria, a significant
investment in knowledge and information source is required. Is
there anything in current incentive schemes to underpin this
kind of investment? Indeed, are there any real incentives for
sell-side equity analysts to help to establish responsible
investment approaches at all?
Sell-side equity analysts, like most trading floor professionals,
share in an incentive structure that provides a basic salary,
potentially supplemented (substantially) by a (i.e., year-end)
bonus. This structure matches the revenue-oriented nature of
sell-side equity research and the transaction that underpins it.
For the analyst the rewards are substantially deferred, as most
investment banks pay bonuses on an annual basis and only a
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What, from the perspective of sell-side analysis, could be done
to break through the current impasse?
Mainstream sell-side equity analysts are geared-up to provide
commercial research services to their clients. The principal
reason they do not engage in responsible investment issues is
that there is too little incentive (and possibly a strong
disincentive) to do so.
Changes that will occur anyway
This section looks at the current changes in the gathering of
information, and the  sell-side equity research business model
presently underway. Changes are due to occur because:
Information is improving. Constructing a data set and
analytical tools for non-financial criteria, that compares to
those existing for financial data, represents a major hurdle to
the mainstreaming of responsible investment. Individual
corporations still need to disclose more information and,
importantly, be willing to discuss more openly and specifically
the implications of key social and environmental drivers on
their business. Cooperation between companies is also going
to be necessary in order to establish meaningful benchmarks
of performance across sectors. At the same time, it is going to
be vital for companies to support (with timely information) the
activities of outside parties, to enable them to continue to
gather data and to refine their own techniques.
Sell-side equity research is already facing changes, driven by
an altogether different debate than that of responsible
investment. Regulation of the role has increased on both sides
of the Atlantic and includes analysts’ relationships with trading
desks and corporate finance activities. Over the next year it
will become more apparent what regulators are seeking in
terms of the “unbundling” of research from other investment
banking services.
Changes are also continuing to occur on the investment value
chain that impact the business model of sell-side equity
research. There is still further to go in terms of long-only funds
cutting their broker lists. Growth in hedge fund activity will
continue to provide an alternative source of commission
revenue. The overall effect is likely to be a continued pressure
on sell-side equity research to further shortening its investment
time horizon.
Sell-side research business models are flexible over time. It
would be wrong to suggest that current pressures on sell-side
equity research mean it is necessarily a “dead-hand”, or
handful have developed systems that pay out on a quarterly
basis. At a business-level, however, annual bonus payments
are an effective way for investment banks to adjust
remuneration depending on overall profitability.
Analysing the strength of this incentive is made difficult
because while there is little overall transparency in analysts’
remuneration. What the results of the Extel and Institutional
Investor Surveys demonstrate is that, in Europe at least, the
basic salary of sell-side equity analysts is considerably higher
than the region’s average income level. Moreover, the details
of recent tribunal hearings suggest that, at least for some
analysts, bonuses can be a multiple of their basic salary in a
period of good profitability. The way sell-side equity analysts’
bonuses are paid is important to the diffusion of responsible
investment because:
Internal perception matters. The criteria by which bonuses 
are determined are often situation-specific and include the 
internal perception of investment banking organizations as 
to the contribution of individual analysts to overall 
investment banking revenue.
Investment in new research methods is very risky. Under 
these conditions, investment by individual sell-side equity 
analysts in upgrading knowledge or in path-breaking 
research is an extremely risky path. A loss of short-term 
servicing that results in lower client reviews or a drop in 
business flows represents a significant opportunity cost in 
terms of reducing the claim to remuneration. 
There is a very high cost to misjudging client demand.
The opportunity cost of investing in a switch of investment 
approach is accentuated by the fact that any misjudgement
of client demands that leads to research being met with 
indifference further undermines a positive perception of an 
analyst’s contribution to the business.
The current structure of incentives for sell-side equity analysts
is designed to focus their efforts on maximizing short-term
revenues, with the internal perception of their contribution
based on concrete “measurables” such as call rates, research
production and client visits. These aims do not marry well with
the immediate investment and overall change in viewpoint
required in a shift toward responsible investment criteria. 
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worse, an obstacle to the mainstreaming of responsible
investment. Research business models are flexible, as is the
population of sell-side equity analysts itself. Changes in the
past, such as the disappearance of some sectors and the
emergence of others, have been accommodated in
recruitment and restructuring decisions. Yet the position of
sell-side equity research as a service provider means that
there is little scope for generating changes from within except
in response to actions made by other parties in the investment
value chain.
Under the right circumstances sell-side equity analysis could
change radically. Sell-side equity analysts will have to adopt
different perspectives in any shift to more responsible
investment criteria. Properly underwritten, the effects would be
radical. There would need to be an investment of time and
money for education in how to analyse companies on this
basis and what the results mean. Analysts would need to
upgrade models, to develop ways of using non-financial data
that are similar to the ways they use financial data, and then
generate meaningful ways of comparing performance between
companies. They would also have to be properly prepared to
challenge companies on their non-financial performance and
discuss how management can improve it.
Changes that will need action by other players in the
investment chain
Sell-side equity analysis is a commercial activity that evolved
over the last 30 years through the combined pressure of
market regulation and of the demands of its clients. It is
unlikely to undertake a unilateral adoption of responsible
investment criteria without explicit support from the buy-side.
The changes that might promote this include:
Finding new ways to pay for sell-side research. In the short
term, clients who require research products — those that lie
outside the current consensus created by financially focused
analysis and short-term share price performance — will (along
with their sell-side counterparts) need to develop explicit ways
of paying for them. This might take the form of specific
directions in terms of allocating future commissions or the
commissioning of specific pieces of research covering this
area. The importance lies in having a distinct vote of support
for this research approach from the client base.
Adoption of responsible investment among the buy-side.
Drivers for this might be institutional investors coming under
pressure from trustees in the pension funds market, SRI funds
gaining greater penetration of the retail funds market or equity
investment models becoming more sophisticated among the
hedge funds. Whatever the process, there is a point (as yet
unclear) at which the buy-side’s desire for analysis based on
responsible investment criteria is significant enough to drive
change in the sell-side.
The willingness of companies to engage in dialogue on
information. This stage would itself contribute to further
developments. Extending the current dialogue on responsible
investing criteria between sell-side equity analysts and
company investor relations could lead to improvements in the
way companies communicate their performance. Sell-side
equity analysts’ demands could also enhance the products of
other information providers.
Changes that would need public policy interventions
Sell-side equity analysts operate within a market mechanism
that has evolved over a considerable period of time. While
practitioners might be wary of interventions affecting the
workings of efficient equity markets, it is a fact that regulation
already shapes the market and there is a role for changes here
to promote responsible investing, such as:
Requiring the publication of information and its assurance. In
terms of information, the main role of public policy intervention
is in requiring its publication and in creating reliable external
assurance. One model might be to have social and
environmental reporting follow the accounting and legal
disclosure frameworks within which companies already
operate.
Making responsible investment a part of professional
competency. The competency of sell-side equity analysts
could be enhanced by introducing questions on responsible
investing into the examinations of the main professional
bodies, such as the Securities Institute and the CFA
programme.
Changing incentives through the financial services industry.
The role of equity analysts and how they are paid has been the
subject of substantial investigation on both sides of the
Atlantic for some time. The motivation behind this has had
nothing to do with accelerating a move towards responsible
investment. In promoting this, market regulators may have to
address the workings of the bonus systems.
R e s p o n s i b l e  I n v e s t m e n t
a n d  P e n s i o n  F u n d s
41
Stephen Davis, President, Davis Global Advisors64
Policymakers around the world have an historic window of
opportunity to shepherd a new political economy of growth.
The reason is the widespread ownership of corporate equities.
Through pension, insurance and savings institutions, millions
of citizen-savers are gradually inheriting potent stakes in the
enterprise — the biggest listed companies — from the state,
tycoons or founding families. This emerging economic reality
blurs the old frontiers between worker and owner, just as
industrialization once overwhelmed social divisions thought
immutable in feudal times. 
At this critical juncture of transition, there is a simultaneous
requirement to offer practical policies designed to match the
vigour of private enterprise to the demands of social
accountability. The key to unlocking progress is an agenda
designed to mobilize ownership to encourage a shift in focus
within the institutional investment community toward greater
consideration of longer-term and non-financial considerations.
This formula represents what I term a “civil economy.” A civil
economy agenda would have the potential to forge new
domestic coalitions behind successful income and
employment-creating policies, and provide global leadership in
shaping the course of market capitalism toward social
responsibility.
This chapter begins with a snapshot of how new financial
realities lay groundwork for the new political economy of
growth. It then paints a picture of how those politics can
energize civil ownership to foster the corporation of the future,
equipped to generate profits, jobs and public goodwill. 
The New Landscape of Share Ownership 
Today, beneficial owners — those who will ultimately benefit
from share ownership of large corporations — are no longer
the wealthy privileged few. Particularly in northern Europe and
North America, but increasingly on a global basis, the
beneficial owners are now the huge majority of working people
who have their pensions and other life savings invested in the
shares of the world’s largest companies. The biggest two
shareholding bodies in Britain, for instance, are the British
Telecom and the mineworkers pension schemes. In Denmark
it’s the ATP, the worker’s pension fund. In Holland it’s ABP, the
civil service fund. In the United States it’s the public employees
of California (CalPERS), and in Canada the teachers and civil
servants of Ontario. Each of these funds holds a small share in
literally thousands of companies. Further, it isn’t just that
domestic funds own the companies in their own nation.
Increasingly, funds have an ever-larger proportion of their equity
invested internationally. Quite literally then, these funds
constitute the majority ownership of our corporate world. Each
pensioner owns a tiny interest in vast numbers of companies;
from the telecoms of Panama to the chemical companies of
Germany, from the electronics companies of Silicon Valley to the
oil wells of Nigeria, millions of citizens are the beneficial owners. 
We have a very different starting point from that faced by the
framers of traditional economic policy and investment
regulation. For instance, the historic rationale for representing
the workers’ interest against the interest of capital makes little
sense. In the new political economy of most advanced
industrialized countries with aging populations, the worker and
global capitalist are one and the same. 
At the same time, the traditional view that employers should be
relatively unfettered in going about their business has been
discredited by episodes of domestic and international scandals
rocking listed companies. In some markets, criticism has
focused on excessive director pay unlinked to performance or
out of proportion with workplace norms. Elsewhere boards
have gone astray with instances of fraudulent financial
reporting, wanton abuse of stakeholders (including workers,
investors and consumers), and cavalier treatment of
communities in which firms operate. Both the global reach of
corporations and the new facts of mass ownership are
compelling us to rethink the frameworks of enterprise.
Thanks to the new make-up of capital markets, positions once
frozen into (bi-polar) place are now thawing into a semblance
of fluidity. The path to a robust civil economy now depends on
policymakers being able to identify the ways in which the
interests of citizen-owners routinely fail to be reflected in
money management by institutional investors, and then to
define remedies.
Engaged Shareowners
Just as civil society requires engaged citizens for its success,
so a civil economy requires owners who perform a similar role.
Today, institutional investors managing the savings of tens of
millions of people quietly own vast swathes of the market all
over the world. But too many funds shirk fiduciary obligations
to savers when they neglect to challenge corporate authority,
even when an investee company’s management is patently
flawed. 
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undertaken for purposes of improving governance and not to
support a takeover.
Certain markets also limited investor power by handing
managements of companies the authority to make decisions
without consulting shareowners. The United States is the
prime example: under federal and state laws, boards can
retain sole power to alter investor rights by introducing
takeover defences. They can also restrict minority rights by
imposing formidable hurdles, or banning investors’ rights to
summon special meetings. And in both the US and Canada
investors have limited ability to alter boards with which they
may be displeased. Ballots permit only a yes or a withhold
vote, meaning that even if every share save one voted to
withhold for an entire slate, the directors would still all reach
office. In other markets, shareowners are rendered less potent
by rules giving them little information about companies, or by
voting practices that favour voting by loyal and local investors.
Such practices may have been appropriate when ownership
was closely held — it is unworkable when ownership is
dispersed. 
In some markets, governments have inhibited investor power
by restricting the rise of pension funds or placing severe limits
on their ability to invest in equities. France is the most obvious
example of the former: the issue of establishing corporate
retirement schemes is fraught with politics, as a significant
portion of the trade union movement believes that the
government would inevitably reduce state pension benefits if
they were widely introduced. But their absence has reduced
the potential for domestic liquidity, so that today the largest
French public companies are majority or near-majority owned
by outside investors, far less concerned about the social
impact on France of corporate behaviour. 
Perhaps the greatest weakness faced by investors is the one
most deeply embedded in the institutions’ own architecture.
The truth is that most funds fail to meet the bedrock
governance standards they increasingly demand of
companies. This can most clearly be seen in the principal
ways in which accountability and transparency fall short.
Savers can rarely discover how their funds are managed.
Only beginning in September 2004, for instance, could
investors in US mutual funds discover how their stock is
voted. Such information remains hidden elsewhere in the
world. Without such disclosure, the risks that conflicts of
interest affect decisions rise. A mutual fund is unlikely to
vote shares against a company’s management if it wants
business from the CEO. But it will more likely do so if the
The roots of this disengagement are clear: a generation ago,
the ownership of companies became divorced from
management control. Essentially, the shareholder was
encouraged to think of his or her ownership interest in the
company as a “tradable security,” not as a right of ownership. If
the company performed badly, the shareholder would sell.
Shareholder rights were (at best) seen as equivalent to
consumer rights. If you did not like the company’s behaviour,
you would sell and take your investment elsewhere.
Rules and practices in big capital markets hemmed-in
shareowner power in a variety of ways. For one, statutes,
regulations and court decisions installed the general principle
that investor concern for a corporation’s relationship to social,
ethical and environmental (SEE) concerns would normally
constitute a breach of fiduciary responsibility. The (Lord Justice)
Megarry judgment set this standard in the UK, the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulations did so in the US,
and the Canada Business Corporations Act (CBCA) did the
same in Canada. The CBCA, for instance, explicitly allowed
companies to delete any dissident shareowner resolutions that
addressed social matters. As a natural consequence, most
institutions steered well clear of applying social, ethical or
environmental screens to portfolio selection or ownership
engagement. The Clinton administration’s Labor Department
tried to lower the bar with an interpretation of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). But those efforts did
not affect securities regulation, leaving fiduciary responsibilities
ambiguous. The UK Labour government has proposed reforms
of the Companies Act [1989] that would enshrine investors’
rights to consider SEE issues when constructing portfolios.
Until that happens, fiduciary obligations there also remain in a
grey zone. The result is often a serious mismatch of
performance measures. Companies in some jurisdictions are
actually obligated to address the interests of all stakeholders,
including shareowners. But shareowners of those same
companies may be driven by their own fiduciary constraints to
press boards to satisfy investors alone. 
Market architecture suppressed shareowner power in other
ways, too. Laws discouraged cooperation among funds on
the grounds that they might constitute a joint-party with
sufficient blocs to mount a takeover. In the US, many such
barriers were only lowered in the early 1990s after CalPERS
asked the SEC for reform. Before that, institutions had to
undertake cumbersome and expensive procedures if they
wished to merely consult with like funds on the state of affairs
at a particular company. Some markets retain restrictions. For
their part, funds support model statutes that provide a legal
safe harbour for such consultations, provided that they are
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company is troubled and that such votes will become
public. (See “Effects of Sunshine” for examples.)
Savers normally have no voice in how the funds operate, or
who makes key fund decisions. Corporate funds and
employee stock plans in many jurisdictions are entirely or
largely controlled by company management. At Enron, that
arrangement gave management the ability to steer
disproportionate amounts of employee capital into the
firm’s own equity. In fact, such funds very often serve as
reliable pro-management voting blocs in the event of
contests. More generally, pension plans controlled by
corporations typically vote shares mechanically with
management. Since the issue lies at the heart of the control
of capital, the question of whether pension fund members
should elect trustees is a critical one, with fiercely held
views on both sides. 
Boards of trustees of pension schemes generally do not
operate as professional oversight bodies. Recent probes in
the US, UK and the Netherlands have exposed many of the
flaws. Most trustees are not getting trained, spend too little
time on the job, communicate too little with scheme
members and ignore shareowner activism and socially
responsible investment, according to a Consensus
Research report for the UK Department of Work and
Pensions.lxv They are typically not paid or given authority
comparable to directors at public companies, and few
spend efforts assessing their own performance or
communicating with beneficiaries. In other cases,
particularly those of civil service funds, trustee boards may
be swayed excessively by political factors. Critics, for
instance, say that CalPERS remained silent on the issue of
whether stock options should be counted in financial
statements as an expense, owing to the political clout of
Silicon Valley corporates who were dead set against reform. 
Intermediaries such as investment advisors, gatekeepers,
consultants and fund managers that link trustees to the
investment process typically dominate trustee decision
making. This proves damaging because they are driven by
factors — especially their own pay schemes — to back
short time horizons, excessive trading or stock selection
that disregards SEE and governance risks. Bonuses, for
instance, may be keyed to turnover rather than growth in
portfolio value. 
Too many funds rigidly split the functions of ownership and
portfolio trading. The responsibilities to vote shares and
monitor SEE and governance may often fall into a
compliance or legal division, while professionals doing the
Effects of Sunshine
On 31 August 2004, US mutual funds faced a governance “Big Bang”.
They had to disclose, for the first time, how they have voted shares at
every company they own, foreign or domestic, over the previous year.
Investors are now able to find all the data revealed on new “N-PX”
forms filed on the SEC’s online Edgar (Filings and Forms) site, or on
the mutual funds’ own sites. 
Before 31 August, it was almost impossible for investors to discover
how mutual funds behaved as owners; however N-PX now acts as an x-
ray. Suddenly the market has the tools in hand to distinguish between
funds that vote by rote with management (no matter how troubled the
company), from those that use votes to pressure boards of
underperforming enterprises to shape-up. Further, investors can identify
which funds consider environmental liabilities or workplace practices
part of their risk assessments of companies, by checking how they
voted on dissident shareowner resolutions addressing such topics.
N-PX has already made a positive impact on fund accountability. Take
American Century Investments, based in Kansas City, as an example.
After the SEC adopted its ballot disclosure rule, the company sent
investors a first-ever statement on proxy voting. The fund’s policy at
first clearly signalled that its managers had little interest in playing a
critical role at investee companies. “We do not invest in portfolio
companies with the intention of… ’fixing’ ineffective management.…”
the firm declared. In the new era of transparency that starts in 2004,
funds that cling to such old-style guidelines — treating board elections
as essentially “routine” rubber stamp exercises — may well pay a
price in lost customers. But American Century began releasing actual
voting instructions as early as June, using a particularly user-friendly
system. And it showed the fund voting critically — against CEO
Michael Eisner at Disney, for instance, or regarding many positions
taken by the AFL-CIO against controversial managements.
The Vanguard Group, for another, understood that N-PX would make
its business hinge in part on its public record as a responsible owner.
In November 2003 it revealed that in the pervious year the giant fund
had voted “yes” for slates at an astoundingly low 29% of US
companies — down from 90% in 2002 — because of its stricter
guidelines on board independence.
Investing bodies and market watchers are certain to fashion the new
reams of voting data into fresh tools to assess mutual fund
performance. Their report cards will affect decisions by individual and
institutional investors as they choose which mutuals to trust with their
savings. A first example of this process occurred within weeks of the
31 August disclosure requirement. An AFL-CIO report called “Behind
the Curtain” ranked Putnam Investments last among major mutual
funds in voting to curb excessive executive remuneration. Within days
Putnam, already tarred from trading scandals, announced that it would
launch a thorough review of its proxy voting policies on pay.
R e s p o n s i b l e  I n v e s t m e n t
a n d  P e n s i o n  F u n d s
44
buying and selling of shares are rarely encouraged to gain
knowledge and experience in the ways in which SEE and
governance affect risk and performance of particular
companies. Training and accreditation programmes for
portfolio managers reflect this bias, and few address the
need for knowledge in these areas. At the same time,
professionals charged with monitoring SEE and
governance have little training or experience in the
challenges of business management. They are often given
low status and seen as cost centres and, not surprisingly,
they often fail to gain access at high levels at the
companies they monitor.
In many markets, trade bodies representing institutional
investors or pension funds have failed to form themselves
into political counterweights to the influence of corporate
managements. Policy issues they address, in any case,
typically do not address SEE concerns. One reason is that
they are structured to identify their constituents as the
executives of the funds, not the ultimate beneficiaries. But
executives may themselves have serious conflicts of
interest; for instance, their funds may be controlled by
major corporations. Trade groups therefore miss tapping
the most promising route to political clout: the millions of
grassroots savers whose money they represent. As a result,
the wider, long-term social interests of pensioners are
usually not at the forefront of trade bodies. 
Taken together, these factors render most funds
unaccountable to citizen-savers and, as a consequence,
relatively passive as owners – and the consequences can be
severe. For one, fund aversion to oversight allows some
corporations, enabled by somnolent boards, to engage not
only in infamous cases of larceny, but in a more corrosive
everyday mismanagement of companies’ impact on
shareowner capital, employees and the environment. The
result is that power is abused. At the extreme, scandals
surface: Robert Maxwell’s pension looting in the UK;
TotalFina’s catastrophic Erika shipwreck in France and the
Exxon Valdez spill, demonstrating high-level inattention to
environmental risks; Enron, Tyco, Worldcom and Adelphia
financial frauds in the US; Parmalat, Ahold and Skandia “book-
cooking” in Continental Europe; and HIH Insurance and
One.Tel mismanagement in Australia. 
Enabling Shareholder Engagement
Through voluntary codes, law or regulation, institutional
investors must become transparent and accountable, so that
they act to reduce risks of corporate faults and are more
mindful of the full range of factors that can influence returns
over the long-term investment horizon of their investor base.
The implementation of these codes must be auditable; they
must regularly disclose what guidelines they use in investing,
including whether or not they consider social criteria and how
they vote their shares. Outreach to members through the
Internet and electronic communications should make this
routine. Savers should have a role in selecting trustees of such
funds, and trustees should have access to robust,
independent training programmes, such as those already
sponsored by the US Center for Working Capital and the
Australian Institute of Superannuation Trustees. At the same
time, market regulators should be vigorous in ensuring that
funds operate solely in the interests of their clients, rather than
for other conflicting business interests. 
Some of these reforms are beginning to be introduced by
statute in the UK, US, Australia, France and Germany. Where
implemented, they are spurring funds to play a more active
role as owners, reclaiming, for instance, influence from
intermediaries. That, in turn, has compelled more companies
to clean up their management and improve both their
economic and social responsibility performance. 
As well as ensuring the fiduciary responsibility of large
institutional owners, an especially effective grassroots engine
of shareowner engagement is the fledgling band of investor
groups representing small individual savers. They include
Aktiespararna in Sweden, VEB in the Netherlands and DSW in
Germany. National public policies should be shaped to
encourage such civil economy institutions, since they often are
less inhibited by conflicts to act as watchdogs. 
Most of what is needed from government is surgical
adjustment of regulation and law. The beauty of that equation
— small public expenditure yielding big results — is that it
could be a winning platform for political leaders under
pressure to spur both growth and social justice when there is
limited money in the public till. 
Millions of citizens increasingly own powerful corporations
through their pension, insurance and investment savings. They
represent the engine of the civil economy — but only if public
policy gives them the tools they need to ensure that markets
address social interests. Reforms, either enabling or
mandatory, must focus on measures aimed at accountability
and transparency that mobilize retirement funds and their
agents. 
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Government policy should aim to ensure that trustee
boards meet high disclosure (“Sunshine”) standards so that
members can readily monitor whether their funds are
exercising ownership responsibilities. Share voting records,
for instance, should be made available, policies on
management of conflicts should be clear and public, and
members should be able to tell if and how their collective
savings are helping press companies to improve records on
social, environmental and ethical practices. Some
jurisdictions could consider mandating that policies go to a
member vote on a regular basis, with provision for
members to offer dissident resolutions on the fund’s overall
approaches to investment.
Civil society organizations (CSOs) comparable to
MoveOn.org67, the powerful, Web-based mobilizer of US
grassroots political activism, are likely to be founded. Such
bodies can use emerging information tools such as voting
records to advocate alignment of fund management with
long-term beneficiary interests. They can also help realize
the potential political power of the investor class in contests
over law and regulation. Trade unions in certain countries
have created groups such as this. For instance, the UK’s
Trades Union Congress, following tactics pioneered by the
US AFL-CIO Office of Investment, is attempting to convert
labour-run pension funds into powerful instruments of
shareowner activism. Using think-tank research on fund
manager behaviour, they get trustees to press agents and,
through them, corporations, to improve governance as well
as employee relations. Policymakers can create an
environment fertile for the rise of CSOs by requiring
companies and funds to disclose more. For instance, an
obligation on funds to reveal share voting naturally prompts
the creation of CSO programmes tracking and lobbying
voting. An obligation on companies to unveil more data on
carbon emissions would aid groups benchmarking
company performance in climate change. 
Governments should foster employee pension funds. Big
pools of capital help keep ownership of domestic
corporations close to home. They ensure that workers have
access to stable, insured retirement savings that
complement, but do not substitute for, traditional state
social security systems. Two policy strategies can unlock
benefits. First, trust laws should make each fund fully
accountable to the employees and pensioners who are
members of the scheme. Second, frameworks should
either encourage or require that pension funds make
investment choices, and craft engagement approaches,
focusing on how well corporations meet social,
environmental and ethical tests. Model guidelines of
investor responsibility have been developed by individual
investment houses (such as Insight Investments), and are
being developed by investor groups such as the
International Corporate Governance Network66. 
Pension trustees should be paid, trained and invested with
authority similar to that of a corporate board. For instance,
trustee boards for funds greater than a certain minimum
amount could be encouraged to have separate staff
resources. Public policy should encourage or require new
forms of trustee training, certification, conflict management,
disclosure and ethics, including exposure to the latest
research on the financial impact of SEE performance. The
objective is to enable trustees to satisfy themselves that
member money is invested in public listed companies that
meet reasonable “investment-grade governance” standards
and “SEE worthiness”.
Trustee boards should be accountable to the fund
membership so that their decisions are aligned with
beneficiaries. Government can ensure that a certain
percentage of pension fund trustees are elected by
employees and retirees themselves. They should be elected
in periodic annual meetings with full disclosure of their
attendance, professional backgrounds and other records.
There should also be provisions for beneficiaries to propose
challenge candidates to the board of trustees. 
Policy should spur the establishment of a formal profession
of governance analysts at investing bodies. These
individuals should be skilled not merely in checking
compliance, but in promoting governance and SEE
performance as growth drivers. This implies all the
attributes of professionalism: training, certification, conflict
management, disclosure and ethics. Further, trade bodies,
educational institutions and certification programmes for
portfolio managers should incorporate skill training in SEE
and governance.
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Tipping Points
It is almost always possible to create some positive change. It
is harder to identify the combination of viable actions that
would make a significant difference. For example, requiring
analysts to demonstrate competencies in their handling of non-
financial information would certainly make a difference. But
these changes might remain relatively small if not accompanied
by other changes, for example, in how fund managers receive
incentives. There is a need to focus not just on what counts,
but on what could potentially count in a significant way.
There is no one-stop, “silver bullet” to making the mainstream
financial community more responsive to some of the softer
non-financial factors — including social and environmental
aspects of corporate performance — that have an important
bearing on the success of business models and companies
over the extended period (during which most investors in
pension funds, mutual funds and insurance companies commit
their retirement savings). This viewpoint was confirmed
throughout the roundtables and the background research, and
reaffirmed in other responsible investment initiatives. The
preceding chapters, including the three authored perspectives,
have identified many of the impediments to mainstreaming
responsible investment. The dialogue and research indicated a
high level of agreement about the nature of these
impediments. While these can and have been described
individually, taken together what emerges is a view of an
institutional culture spanning much of the investment
community that needs to be reshaped. Finally, a widely shared
view has been that, left purely to the pressures of the market,
the investment community would be unlikely to overcome
these individual and more pervasive institutional impediments.
Focusing effectively on key tipping points is partly a matter of
timing. Unblocking barriers in the wrong sequence is a little like
“pushing on a rope”. For example, improving the materiality of
data that connects non-financial outcomes to long-term
business performance might have little effect if pension fund
trustees are unwilling to establish mandates for fund manager
that focus on long-term performance. Similarly, increasing
analysts’ competencies in understanding the interface between
longer-term business fundamentals and social and environmental
performance will have little impact if their clients, fund managers,
are locked into the management of indexed funds.
We have brought together and summarized the main elements of
this portfolio of proposals, drawing in particular from the proposals
offered by each of the specialist authors at the end of their
respective chapters. Overall, the proposals focus on three primary
routes to change: incentives, competencies and information.  




Establish an international set of good governance principles for
pension funds — a voluntary Fund Governance Code? that
ensures accountability (disclosure of votes, policies, and
management relationships) and professionalism (training,
representation) on the part of boards of trustees. The aim of 
these principles would be to ensure the representation of long-
termbeneficiary interests in intent, capability and practice.
Modify pension fiduciary rules which discourage or prohibit 
explicit trustee consideration of social and environmental aspects
of corporate performance.
Increase the average duration of asset manager mandates to 
lend momentum to current experimentation with fund manager
compensation arrangements linked to superior long-term
performance.
Increase disclosure of fund manager compensation structures to 
encourage better linkage between pay and long-term performance.
Develop new business models for research on non-financial
issues by analysts and incorporate this into the current regulatory
review of the sell-side analyst function in diversified investment
houses. 
Require analysis of material non-financial factors to be included
in pension fund mandates to asset managers.
Re-evaluate the relationship and relative organizational standing 
of buy-side analysts and portfolio managers in order to cultivate 
a more attractive long-term career path for analysts, allowing for 
the accumulation of necessary expertise. 
Develop new performance assessment models that enable 
trustees to support long-term investment strategies while 
complying with fiduciary obligations.
Build Competencies
Pay, train, and empower pension fund trustees more like 
corporate directors in order to increase the capacity of boards of 
trustees to exercise independent judgement in the long-term 
interests of beneficiaries.
Create a specific professional competency for non-financial 
analysis either through increased training of existing investment 
analysts or the establishment of a new category of specialists.
Increase the emphasis on non-financial aspects of corporate 
performance in graduate business schools and mid-career 
analyst educational programmes.
Improve Information 
Improve the consistency of the content, collection and assurance
of material non-financial information.
Refine the concept of materiality and the basis for measuring and
communicating its application to the links between financial 
performance and social and environmental performance.
Expand the dialogue between analysts and corporate investor 
relations officers on the need for greater consistency in the 
content, collection and assurance of non-financial information.
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broader livelihood strategies than those reflected by traditional
interpretations of fiduciary responsibilities, which include both
financial and non-financial elements. Pension fund investment
strategies clearly impact on both, yet (at best) they understand
their own performance purely in terms of direct financial returns.
One useful way to spur progress would be to establish an
international set of good governance principles for pension
funds akin to a corporate governance code. These voluntary
principles, perhaps memorialized in a Fund Governance Code,
would aim to ensure that pension trustees, and others
governing the use of funds owned elsewhere, demonstrably
represent beneficiary interests in intent, capability and
practice. Such a Code should include the requirement for
trustees to be certified as competent to understand, for
example, technical dimensions of investment practices,
conflict management, disclosure and ethics. Maintaining an
acceptable level of competencies would require regular
exposure to the latest research on beneficiary interests and
the links between financial and non-financial performance.
Intended beneficiaries should be able to tell if and how their
collective savings are helping press companies to improve
records on social and environmental practices. As part of this
Code, trustees should therefore be required to meet high
disclosure standards, enabling members to readily monitor
whether their funds are exercising ownership responsibilities.
Share voting records, for instance, should be made available,
and policies on management of conflicts should be clear and
public. Accountability, through clear processes of
representation, need to accompany the principle of
transparency. Trustee boards should be accountable to the
fund membership so that their decisions are aligned with
beneficiaries’ interests. Governments can ensure that a certain
percentage of pension fund trustees are elected by employees
and retirees themselves. They should be elected in periodic
meetings with full disclosure of their attendance, professional
backgrounds and other records. There should also be
provisions for beneficiaries to propose challenge candidates to
the board of trustees.
Informing intended beneficiaries is crucial, but not enough to
ensure that trustees act on their behalf. Some jurisdictions
could consider mandating that policies go to a member vote
on a regular basis, with provision for members to offer
dissident resolutions on the fund’s overall approaches to
investment. In other cases, a “lighter touch” might be
preferred, focused more on shifting the culture within which
trustees understand and act out their responsibilities. This can
be realized by an obligation on the part of trustees to
demonstrate a specific understanding of the interests of their
Upgrade the Governance of Pension Funds
to Reflect their Central Role in Equity Markets
If pension plan participants, through their pension funds, do
not convey an interest in seeing their money managed in a
manner that takes full account of factors that shape corporate
performance over the long run, then their agents and service
providers further down the investment value chain can hardly
be expected to act differently. By contrast, if the trustees of
major pension funds were, as a matter of course, to require
social, ethical, and environmental considerations to be
explicitly considered in investment processes, then the highly
competitive financial services industry would likely respond
rapidly with services tailored specifically to such a mandate. In
this sense, the most likely tipping point in the complex
framework of impediments to and opportunities for
mainstreaming responsible investment is likely to be found in
the area of pension fund governance. 
We have witnessed a decade of dramatic developments in our
appreciation of the importance of corporate governance. This
has driven a growing number of major initiatives, often framed
by codes setting out the principles of good governance and its
implications for practice. These codes have been wide-
ranging, covering how board directors of companies are
selected, their competencies and responsibilities, and the way
in which these responsibilities are manifested. Codes have
demonstrated a growing appreciation of the impact of non-
financial issues on company performance, which in turn has
triggered the development of a new generation of strategic
management and accounting tools, as well as broadened
disclosure requirements. In this context, understanding
stakeholder concerns is no longer seen as a “nice” thing to
do, but rather as a competency and practice; boards have to
be able to demonstrate a willingness and ability to put this into
practice. 
Yet throughout and despite these on-going changes, the
pension fund industry has remained largely unaffected. While
the future livelihoods of the real owners of capital, notably
pension policy holders, depend profoundly on the
performance of their capital, the trustees of their futures,
advisors and implementing agents are largely obscured from
view, and in the main do not see themselves as having
responsibilities equivalent to company directors. Their
collective competencies, the basis on which decisions are
made, and even the consequences of these decisions, are
mainly opaque to those for whom they act. Intended
beneficiaries are, of course, in part protected through the
fiduciary requirements of these stewards of capital. But even
here the interests of intended beneficiaries are underpinned by
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intended beneficiaries, particularly with respect to non-financial
interests. These interests may be relevant both as an end in
themselves, or through their potential impacts on the financial
interests of intended beneficiaries. 
This latter element is consistent with an emerging body of
corporate governance and related risk reporting requirements
that necessitate companies demonstrate an adequate
understanding of the interests of their shareholders and other
stakeholders. The evidence from other regulatory and
voluntary “light touch” initiatives (that involve credible and
reported engagement of boards and managers with their
stakeholders) is that their impacts go beyond informational
change and, over time, reshape competencies and underlying
cultures of decision-making.
Engaging intended beneficiaries as citizens would require that
they were well-informed, able to interpret relevant information,
and possessed the means to act on that information, whether
individually or collectively. When it comes to pension funds and
other financial instruments, most people feel quite helpless.
Few understand even the limited information that is available,
and generally act in ignorance, and largely in isolation. The
effectiveness of any Code that amplified the voice of intended
beneficiaries would need to be underpinned by a broad-based
educational model, serving to enhance their ability to
understand and act on information concerning the actual and
possible uses of their capital. Elements of such a model do
already exist, often developed and delivered by civil society
organizations and publicly-funded citizen advisory services,
such as MoveOn.org68, the powerful, Web-based mobilizer of
US grassroots political activism. Such bodies can use
emerging information tools such as voting records to advocate
alignment of fund management with long-term beneficiary
interests. They can also help realize the potential political
power of the investor class in contests over law and
regulation. Trade unions in certain countries have created
groups such as this. For instance, the UK’s Trades Union
Congress, using tactics pioneered by the US AFL-CIO Office
of Investment, is attempting to convert labour-run pension
funds into powerful instruments of shareowner activism.
Such a Code could be developed and adopted voluntarily by
the industry, following the pathway taken by many corporate
governance initiatives, particularly in Europe. In other
instances, such a Code could be backed by legislation to
avoid free riders and ensure compliance, more akin to a US
approach. In practice, differing enforcement approaches are
likely to be taken, but the key starting point is to acknowledge
the need and to develop a basic framework that could be
relevant to trustees in the major markets (Europe, North
America and Japan), but also increasingly elsewhere in Africa,
Asia and Latin America.
Strengthen the Capacity of Fund Managers And Research
Analysts to Serve Long-term Institutional Owners
The fund management industry pursues predominantly short-
term investment strategies, even so-called “perpetual
investors”, which can be best understood as adopting short-
term investment approaches, perpetually. These practices are
pursued, although the evidence points unambiguously to the
enhanced financial returns associated with successful long-
term investment strategies, and in contrast to the interests of
the owners of capital mainly being long term. This “short-
termism” is underpinned by performance benchmarking to
indices that encourage fund managers to focus excessively on
beating short-term market movements. This practice is, in
turn, reinforced by advice to fund trustees from their advisors,
further embedding such benchmarking at the heart of pension
fund mandates. Current approaches to risk-adjusted returns,
in short, drive trustees to focus on the mitigation of personal
risk by focusing on short-term market tracking, even with the
knowledge that this does not optimize long-term returns. 
Responsible investment clearly requires an orientation towards
strategies that optimize long-term returns, because: (1) this
delivers better financial returns over the time profile that
interests intended beneficiaries, and (2) social and
environmental issues become more material over these
periods, and so can be better considered. Realigning fund
management towards the longer-term performance of their
investees requires a host of measures, embracing changes in
incentives, competencies and available information. 
The foregoing discussion has highlighted a number of areas in
which asset managers and investment analysts, whether from
the buy- or sell-side, would need to evolve and modify their
services and practices, if responsible investment were to
become a mainstream practice in the financial community. In
particular, research into non-financial information would need
to expand and be financed differently. The structure of
compensation for fund managers and analysts would need to
change, to reflect a higher premium placed by long-term
institutional owners (like pension funds) on superior long-term
fund performance. The training of analysts and portfolio
managers, whether in graduate business schools or mid-
career professional courses, would need to substantially
incorporate more time on social, ethical, and environmental
issues and how they can drive long-term financial returns.
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Shifts in pension fund mandates with realigned incentives are
necessary but not sufficient to mainstream responsible
investment. Clearly, the ability of mainstream analysts and fund
managers to factor in social and environmental issues requires
them to, first and foremost, understand them. In the last two
decades, the development of equity analysis has focused
largely on developing financial expertise, anticipating corporate
events and establishing valuation benchmarks. Competency
revolves around the interpretation of accounts, the analysis of
structural position and the development of discounted cash
flow valuation models. Analysis of non-financial criteria has
remained thin where it exists, focused mainly on “quality of
management”. 
There has been some increased understanding of social and
environmental issues by the growing number of analysts and
fund managers working alongside specialist SRI teams.
However, this growing appreciation has been mitigated by the
weakness of data, and the focus of analysts and fund
managers’ clients on shorter-term variables. For this reason,
the development of appropriate competencies will in all
likelihood be market-driven on the back of changing client
needs. Fund managers would be required to demonstrate, in
responses to Requests for Proposals, their skills in longer-term
investment strategies. And they, in turn, demand very different
research from analysts, which drives a competency shift in this
part of the investment value network.
There would be a need, however, to develop a more effective
means of assessing and attesting to the competencies of key
players. This would be particularly important in the early
stages for investment houses, since their competencies will
(more than previously) underpin their bids for fund
management deals. Over time, however, this may become
less important as more investment houses build up a track
record in successful, longer-term investment management.
Taken together, this package of proposals, further developed
and implemented, would encourage pension fund trustees
and other capital stewards to request proposals from fund
managers that, to be successful, would require:
investment strategies linked to longer-term 
performance benchmarks;
incentives demonstrably aligned to such performance;
a clearly established basis of relevant and adequate
competencies on the part of the fund management team to
effectively implement the proposed investment strategy.
An underlying, further need is to develop and implement
acceptable performance assessment models that enable
trustees to support long-term investment strategies while
complying with their fiduciary responsibilities. These long-term
performance models are beginning to emerge, often
underpinning funds with a corporate governance focus, and
sometimes associated with funds with explicit non-financial (as
well as financial) aims. However, to date these have remained
largely marginal to the bulk of fund management strategies
and practices.
The basis on which such strategies and practices evolve
needs to become a key competitive edge for fund managers.
One way to encourage this is for trustees and other capital
providers to demand performance benchmarks that
distinguish between sources of return underlying fund
management strategies and practices. While benchmarks will
differ widely, a useful underlying starting point may be to
establish benchmarks that separate portfolio performance into
three fundamental sources of return: (1) dividends; (2) earnings
(that portion which is not paid out in the form of dividends);
and (3) valuation changes (of the company). Distinguishing
among these fundamental elements of return can be very
useful from a trustee’s perspective, in that it reveals much
about fund managers’ investment processes. Over long
periods of time, “income” oriented managers, for example,
should show a pattern of high returns from dividends and
lower returns from the remaining two factors. Similarly, “value”
oriented managers should show a balance between returns
from dividends and those from changes in companies’
valuations, as companies’ presumably healthier-than-expected
business prospects become recognized in the market-place.
“Growth” oriented managers should show very little returns
from dividends, and much more earnings growth and changes
in valuations69.
“Operationalizing” the next generation of performance
benchmarks, focused on the longer term, would have to be
done in conjunction with a number of other initiatives; for
example: 
transparency, to capital providers, of investment strategies
in adopted practice, including the actual proxy voting
behaviour by fund managers;
disclosure of information, as increasingly demanded in the
US, about the relationship between rewards to both the
investment house and individual fund managers, and the
proposed basis for driving and benchmarking full-term fund
performance.
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Increasing the Availability and Utility of 
Non-Financial Information
Even if there were major changes in pension fund governance
and asset management analyst capabilities along the lines
proposed above, serious issues would remain regarding the
quality and utility of non-financial information. The effective
operation of the investment value chain depends, ultimately,
on information provided by and about the likely future
performance of potential investees (the business community).
The quantity of corporate non-financial information has
increased dramatically in recent years, particularly from those
companies publicly listed in Western Europe and North
America, and to a lesser extent in emerging markets like Brazil
and South Africa. Initiatives promoting more standardized non-
financial reporting, such as the Global Reporting Initiative
Guidelines70, have driven an improvement in practices, as have
emerging models of sustainability assurance, such as
AccountAbility’s AA1000 Framework71. Furthermore, a new
generation of investor-facing indexes is also emerging, seeking
to bridge measures of social and environmental performance
to future financial performance (led by the SAM Group’s
innovative Dow Jones Sustainability Index), and includes a
growing array of largely risk-focused tools. 
Yet the fact remains that the coverage, quality and level of
credible assurance remains very patchy72. Crucially, the ability
of businesses to credibly articulate the materiality of social and
environmental issues to future financial performance, let alone
share prices and dividends, is extremely poor. This shortfall is
becoming even more significant as regulations on corporate
governance and risk-related reporting increasingly demand
companies to disclose “material non-financial issues that are
likely to impact on future business performance”. These
regulatory moves will increase pressure to accelerate the
development of robust methodologies in the face of litigation
dangers associated with inappropriate metrics or
misjudgements in the nature and degree of substantive
materiality. 
The danger is that emerging metrics and guidance will be
framed by the very narrowness of perspective and “short-
termism” in the investment community that is at issue. Most
social and environmental aspects of corporate performance
will be deemed “immaterial” by the bulk of the investment
community, which has little interest in longer-term performance
(or the broader dimensions of performance) of inherent interest
to intended beneficiaries of retiree saving vehicles like pension
funds. Overcoming this double bind requires the evolution of
methodologies that frame materiality in terms of:
both short- and longer-term performance, and;
both narrow financial goals and broader concerns.
That is, there is a need for disclosure to be driven by multiple
levels of materiality, thus making broader and longer-term
dimensions of material non-financial performance more visible,
alongside data relevant only to narrower, shorter-term financial
performance. Some work has already progressed in this field,
both to inform service providers delivering sustainability
assurance and those companies responding to new regulatory
requirements such as the UK company law Operating and
Financial Review. This work has guided companies to disclose
social and environmental performance relevant to short-term
financial performance, corporate policies, the non-financial
disclosure practices of business peers, and specific
stakeholder concerns, as well as broader societal norms. This
”tiered” approach to materiality is proving effective in
encouraging companies to develop metrics models that can
distinguish different type of materiality, and in providing more
structured information to investors.
Although progress has been made, much remains to be done
in redefining materiality and establishing a suitable basis to
measure and communicate its application to the links between
social and environmental and financial performance. Arguably,
the greatest gap lies not so much in reporting, but in the area
of strategy development. As one analyst remarked, “There is
no point in demanding metrics from a management team that
does not even intuitively understand the relevance of the non-
Source: AccountAbility
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trustees think and act, while encouraging the emergence of
new investment vehicles. The drive toward improved risk
management and the longer-term stability of returns, together
with the growing importance of intangible assets in the
valuation process, is encouraging the creation of new tools
and enforcing the need for new competencies. 
The social and environmental dimensions of the investment
equation are part of this changing landscape. Crucially, it is not
an add-on or an appendix to other more fundamental shifts –
it is part of, and integral to, these deeper changes. Integrating
social and environmental dimensions of investment is about
better understanding and responding to the interests of the
ultimate owners of capital. It is about moving the relationship
between investors and investees towards a focus on long-
term performance, and raising the bar of that performance to
ensure that social and environmental issues — key
foundations of tomorrow’s markets — are taken into account,
and therefore counted in business and investment decisions.
This in turn requires shifts in how the intermediaries operate,
including trustees, fund managers and analysts, but also
including rating agencies, advisors and many other actors.
Their competencies, the tools they use and the basis on which
they are rewarded all have to evolve to ensure alignment of
changes at the two opposite ends: the interests of the owners
of capital and the basis on which value is created by
businesses.
This initial stage of the Global Corporate Citizenship Initiative’s
Mainstreaming Responsible Investment project has highlighted
the importance of these changes and pointed to specific
opportunities for progress, based on the discussions in our
roundtables and developed in greater detail in the preceding
chapters. While progress has been made, it is apparent there
would be merit in deepening the dialogue on some of the
issues raised in this report among companies, pension
trustees, advisors, fund managers, analysts, policymakers and
independent experts. Among the most promising areas for
continued discussion and research are:
What might an international set of voluntary principles for
good governance of pension funds contain?
Which jurisdictions would benefit by a change in fiduciary
guidelines to provide greater scope for consideration by
trustees of social, ethical, and environmental
considerations, and how should such changes be
structured to have maximum benefit and minimal effect on
existing legal structures?
financials.” This is clearly less so where social and
environmental factors become more visible in the market,
either because they are traded or because they carry statutory
weight, as we increasingly see in the case of climate change.
But even in cases of such importance, it is surprising how few
companies have really worked through for themselves the
longer-term implications for their business models. More
generally, the measurement gap reflects a more fundamental
shortfall in most companies’ underlying appreciation of the
importance of social and environmental factors in informing
business strategy and enhancing performance. 
A new generation of strategic management tools is needed
that offers a more sophisticated treatment of non-financial
performance drivers, including social and environmental
dimensions. Emerging innovations in risk measurement and
management offer part of the solution, but they remain limited
in focusing mainly on downside risk, and generally fail to
illuminate strategic choices resulting from predicted significant
shifts in a company’s social and environmental context.
Obesity for the food industry, climate change for the
automobile industry, preventative health models for the
pharmaceutical industry or demographics for the pension
industry are but a few cases of momentous, market changing
factors that were widely debated in society, yet failed to impact
all but the most progressive companies until they had short-
term financial significance. Initiatives, such as the Global
Leadership Network and work at Harvard’s CSR Initiative, are
moving this agenda forward in developing understanding and
tools to support the integration of social and environmental
issues into business strategy development and management73.
Much, however, remains to be done in establishing effective
platforms for senior business managers to focus on the
strategic dimensions of social and environmental issues, and
for linking these platforms to executive compensation and
investor communications.
Extending the Dialogue 
The next decade is likely to see significant changes in the
investment community. Demographic changes alone will
reshape our understanding of what the capital markets can
and cannot provide to ageing populations. As Alan Greenspan
commented, “As a nation, we owe it to our retirees to promise
only the benefits that can be delivered. If we have promised
more than our economy has the ability to deliver to retirees
without unduly diminishing real income gains of workers, as I
fear we may have, we must recalibrate our programmes.”74
Growing demands for choice and control by the ultimate
owners of capital are already reshaping how pension fund
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What new business models for non-financial research by
the buy- or sell-side are possible, perhaps driven by
changes in the mandates provided by pension funds to
asset managers?
How could compensation arrangements for portfolio
managers be modified to encourage increased focus on
long-term performance, and what conditions would need to
be present for such practices to become more
commonplace within the industry?
How might professional competency in non-financial issues
be developed more fully within the investment analyst
community? 
How could the content, assurance, and collection of
corporate non-financial information be improved so that it 
would be of greater utility to investment analysts?
What new performance assessment models and strategic
management tools (integrating social and environmental
factors) show particular promise?
What does the responsible investment debate imply for
investment in debt and derivative instruments? 
Integrating social and environmental considerations into the
investment decision process is slowly moving from an
incidental activity to one that is integral to the fundamental
changes sweeping the investment world. It is increasingly
central to an appreciation of the interests of the tens of millions
of individual participants in pension funds, mutual funds and
life insurance policies, who now comprise the bulk of share
ownership and, by extension, the future role of financial
markets in supporting global economic growth and social
progress. The World Economic Forum’s Global Corporate
Citizenship Initiative and AccountAbility look forward to the
opportunity to continue this vitally important discussion. 
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